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NOTE
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE RIGHT TO DIE:
BEFORE AND AFTER THE QUINLAN DECISION
INTRODUCTION
Recently the New Jersey Supreme Court confronted the
complex legal and social issues surrounding an individual's
"right to die."' The question whether life-prolonging measures
should be utilized by the medical profession to prevent the
natural death of one who is in an irreversible unconscious state
was presented to the court in what many consider the most
celebrated case of this decade.
This question has burdened the medical profession since
the development of life-prolonging devices. Prior to In re
Quinlan, however, the medical profession dealt with the issue
without judicial interference or guidance. 2 Before the Quinlan
litigation it was common practice for the family and the physi-
cian, or the physician alone, to make the decision as to "when
artificial life support mechanisms are to be withdrawn from a
person who will never regain consciousness."' As a result of the
recent rise in medical malpractice litigation, the medical pro-
fession has called upon the courts to resolve the issue of when
life-prolonging devices may be withdrawn from a patient.4
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
B. COLEN, KAE ANN QUINLAN-DYING IN THE AGE OF ETERNAL LIFE (1976).
3 Note, Voluntary Euthanasia: A Proposed Remedy, 39 ALANY L. REv. 826, 837
(1975)[hereinafter cited as Voluntary Euthansia: A Proposed Remedy]. See also Note,
Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations, 48 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 1202 (1973)[hereinafter cited as Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitu-
tional and Legislative Considerations].
I COLEN, supra note 2, at 52. The physicians treating Karen were aware of the legal
problems they faced in an era where malpractice has come to mean treating unsuccess-
fully rather than treating improperly.
We know, for instance, that the same week the Quinlans filed their
petition in Superior Court, Dr. Ashad Javed [one of Karen's physicians]
contacted his malpractice insurance carrier, told them he was concerned,
and asked for legal assistance. The malpractice carrier, Chubb & Son, Inc.,
provided Dr. Javed with the services of Ralph Porzio. Porzio was described
.. . by. . . Chubb's vice president for claims, as "probably one of the most
distinguished legal-medical men in the state . . . . We were responsible for
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Due to the growing number of people who reach old age
and the increase in the incidence of diseases such as cancer, 5
there is growing interest in the practice of euthanasia.' Several
factors indicate that the public favors the practice of euthana-
sia in certain circumstances. First, there is no doubt that mem-
bers of the medical profession do practice euthanasia. In terms
of equality for patients who have serious medical problems, it
is imperative that a legal precedent be established on this
issue. Until such a precedent is established, doctors will con-
tinue to practice euthanasia at their own discretion, placing
patients being treated by different doctors in inequitable posi-
tions.
Secondly, an increasing majority of people in this country
are in favor of allowing some form of euthanasia. Two Gallup
polls, one in 1950 and another in 1973, showed an increase in
his bills ...I don't know if [a possible malpractice] suit was their man's
fear, but it was the basis on which [Javed] came to us. They must have been
concerned about it."
Id. at 52-53.
5 Gurney, Is There a Right to Die?-A Study of the Law of Euthanasia, 3 Cuti.-
SAM. L. REV. 235, 236 (1972).
6 The word "euthanasia" is of Greek origin. The literal translation is "good
death," coming from eu-, meaning "good," and thanatos, meaning "death." WEBsTER's
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 786 (3d ed. 1966). Webster defines euthanasia as "(1)
an easy death or means of inducing one" and "(2) the act or practice of painlessly
putting to death persons suffering from incurable conditions of disease." Id. Black's
definition is narrower, defining euthanasia as "[tihe act or practice of painlessly
putting to death persons suffering from incurable and distressing disease." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 654 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
There is disagreement over whether euthanasia encompasses acts of commission
only, HEIFETZ, THE RIGHT TO DIE 96 (1975) or acts of both commission and omission.
Comment, The Right to Die, 10 CAL. W. L. Rav. 613 (1974); Silving, Euthanasia: A
Study in Comparative Criminal Law, 103 U. PA. L. REy. 350, 351 n.5 (1954). The
authors of this Note will assume the word "euthanasia" includes acts of both omission
and commission. However, when the term is used it will be preceded by the word
"active" (meaning that death was caused by an act that hastened the patient's death)
or the word "passive" (meaning that death was caused by natural expiration because
extraordinary medical procedures were never administered or were withdrawn) when
the distinction is necessary.
I In one survey, 61% of the doctors responding to questionnaires admitted prac-
ticing some form of euthanasia. 8 J. OF FOR. MED. 57, 68 (1961) and TUaBO, AN ACT OF
MERCY: EUTHANASIA TODAY, 42-43 (1973), cited in Voluntary Euthanasia: A Proposed
Remedy, supra note 3, at 826. Another survey of doctors indicated that 44% of the
respondents frequently omitted life-prolonging procedures and medications. 5 INT'L J.
OF PSYCH. IN MED. 18, 19 (1974), while a third survey indicated that as many as 80%
of the doctors questioned practiced euthanasia. 218(1) J.A.M.A. 249 (1971).
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the number of people favoring active euthanasia from 36 to 53
percent.' Another poll indicated 76 percent of the respondents
were in favor of euthanasia legislation.' Proposed euthanasia
legislation has been before legislatures in a number of states,"0
and just recently euthanasia legislation became law in Califor-
nia." Reaction to this type of legislation, however, has not al-
ways been favorable. 2
A third factor indicating that public sentiment is in favor
of euthanasia is the fact that in criminal cases involving active
euthanasia the jury usually fails to convict the defendant of
first degree murder,'" even though most authorities agree that
all of the elements of first degree murder are present. 4 For
example, in the case of Dr. Vincent Montmarano, the defen-
dant had allegedly given an injection of potassium chloride to
a cancer patient who was expected to die within 48 hours."
Although the evidence clearly indicated that the defendant was
'14(3) MED. WORLD NEWS 73, 74-75 (Sept. 14, 1973).
8 J. OF FOR. MED. 47, 77 (1961).
" Between 1971 and 1974, at least 10 states considered euthanasia legislation. Of
the 10 bills drafted, eight proposed passive euthanasia (Del. H.B. 251 (1973); Fla. H.B.
407 (1973); Md. H.B. 700 (1974); Mass. H.B. 3641 (1974); Ore. H.B. 2997 (1973); Wash.
S.B. 2449 (1973); W.Va. S.B. 358 (1972); Wis. S.B. 670 (1971)) and two proposed active
euthanasia (Mont. H.B. 137 (1973); Ore. H.B. 179 (1973)). Voluntary Euthanasia: A
Proposed Remedy, supra note 3, at 826 n.3. For a summary by the sponsor of the
Florida bill, see 64(3) S. MED. J. 300 (1971).
" California Assembly Bill No. 3060, Ch. 1439, adding Ch. 3.9 (commencing with
Section 7185) to Part 1 of Division 7 of the Health and Safety Code, relating to medical
care [hereinafter cited as California Assembly Bill No. 3060]. For a discussion of this
bill see Conclusion and text accompanying notes 54-68, infra.
,2 An Oregon bill precipitated a landslide of outraged mail and full-page newspa-
per advertisements advocating the bill's defeat. 14(1) MED. WORLD NEws 5 (March 23,
1975).
11 There are no reported cases in which a physician has been prosecuted for omit-
ting or discontinuing the use of extraordinary medical measures. Gurney, supra note
5, at 248; Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations,
supra note 3, at 1202, 1208.
11 Kasimar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing"
Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 969, 970 n. 9 (1958); Silving, supra note 6, at 352-53;
CURRAN & SHAPIRO, LAW, MEDICINE AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 130 (1970) and WILLIAMs, THE
SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 318-19 (1970), cited in Cantor, A Patient's
Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Pres-
ervation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 228, 259 (1973). Motive is irrelevant in a homicide
case: to be guilty of murder the defendant need only have the intent to kill. Kutner,
Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal, 44 IND. L.J. 539, 540 (1969).
12 N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1974, at 44, col. 4.
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guilty,'" the jury acquitted on the first ballot after only 55 min-
utes of deliberation.17 In the only other case in this country in
which a physician was tried for murder for allegedly practicing
active euthanasia, the defendant was also acquitted. 8 Juries
show the same reluctance to convict non-medical defendants
who allegedly have practiced active euthanasia. 9
Society finds euthanasia less reprehensible than the usual
case involving homicide and this is reflected in the jury's deci-
sion. However, as a result of jury reluctance to convict, offend-
ers are being treated inequitably"0 and a gap is arising in the
legal system.' One group of authors asserts that by failing to
treat the euthanasia defendants as murderers, the state is de-
nying the victims both due process and equal protection; and
conversely, that by convicting others as murderers, the state
may be exacting a cruel and unusual punishment.22 "Public
confidence in the administration of criminal justice is hardly
strengthened when moral issues are shifted . . ., or when the
law relegates to juries the function of correcting its inequi-
ties.'23
This Note will cover a variety of areas pertaining to the
withholding and withdrawing of medical treatment. In doing
so, the problems facing the Quinlan court will be analyzed so
that its decision may be better understood. This Note will also
discuss In re Quinlan in depth and the issues not resolved by
that decision. Finally, a "Right to Natural Death Act" will be
proposed . 4
16 N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1975, at 35, cols. 1 and 4; N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1974, at
34, col. 4.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
" 14(3) MED. WORLD NEWS 73 (Sept. 14, 1973).
" A study of 12 cases involving active euthanasia revealed one failure to indict,
seven acquittals, three convictions for an offense less than murder, and only one con-
viction for murder itself. Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative
Considerations, supra note 3, at 1213. See also Silving, supra note 6, at 353; Kutner,
supra note 14, at 540-51.
2' Silving, supra note 6, at 354.
1 Kutner, supra note 14, at 542.
22 Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations,
supra note 3, at 1229.
23 Silving, supra note 6, at 354.
2' This Note will discuss current cases concerning the right to die and the ramifica-
tions of those cases. It is an objective analysis of law which is not intended to reflect
any particular religious or philosophical viewpoint.
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I. THE STATE OF THE LAW PRIOR TO THE Qu LAN DECISION
A. The Basis for Refusal and Withdrawal of Medical
Treatment
1. The Doctor-Patient Relationship
The "right" of an individual to determine when bodily
invasion in the form of medical treatment will occur is not a
new concept in the law. The right stems from the basic princi-
ple that each person has a right to self-determination over his
own body. 2s John Stuart Mill recognized this right in 1873 when
he stated: "Each is the proper guardian of his own health,
whether bodily or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater
gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to them-
selves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the
rest."26 The United States Supreme Court first recognized that
individuals are sovereign over their own persons in Union Pa-
cific Railway v. Botsford.2" In repudiating attempts to compel
a personal injury plaintiff to undergo pre-trial medical exami-
nation, the Supreme Court commented:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by
the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all re-
straint or interference by others, unless by clear and unques-
tionable authority of law.3
The medical patient's right to bodily control has been
embodied in the tort doctrine of informed consent. Absent an
emergency, no medical procedure or treatment may be per-
formed by a physician without the patient's consent.29 Such
consent may be obtained only after explanation of the nature
of the treatment, the risks involved, and alternative thera-
pies.3" The theory behind the requirement of informed consent
' Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632, 1634 (1973).
This principle implies that there exist categories of decisions which an individual must
be permitted to make, even if others believe the individual decides irrationally or
incorrectly. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 61 (Supp. 1968).
2, J.S. MILL, On Liberty, in JOHN STUART MiLL: THREE ESSAYS at 18 (1975).
141 U.S. 250 (1891).
21 Id. at 251.
Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1951); Annot., 9 A.L.R. 1391, 1392 (1966).
See generally Note, Informed Consent as a Theory of Medical Liability, 1970
1977l
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is variously expressed as assault, battery, negligence, malprac-
tice, or even trespass, but the underlying concept of protection
of bodily integrity remains the crux of informed consent.
Judge Cardozo articulated the doctrine well when he
stated:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a
surgeon who performs an operation without his consent com-
mits an assault, for which he is liable. This is true, except in
cases of emergency where the patient is unconscious, and
where it is necessary to operate before consent can be ob-
tained.'
One court has acknowledged that the exercise of self-
determination by the patient may mean the refusal of lifesav-
ing assistance.
Anglo-American Law starts with the premise of thorough-
going self-determination. It follows that each man is consid-
ered to be master of his own body, and he may, if he be of
sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life saving
surgery, or other medical treatment. A doctor might well be-
lieve that an operation or form of treatment is desirable or
necessary, but the law does not permit him to substitute his
own judgment for that of a patient by any form of artifice or
deception.2
The doctrine of informed consent involves two elements:
(1) The patient must be given all pertinent information about
his condition, and (2) he must assent to treatment.3 Thus the
competent patient retains control over decisions about treat-
ment even if he is suffering from a terminal illness. 4 The logical
Wis. L. REV. 879; Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy for the
Doctor-Patient Relationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533 (1970); Comment, Failure to Inform
as Medical Malpractice, 23 VAND. L. REv. 754 (1970).
1, Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (citation
omitted).
1 Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960). See also Woods v. Brum-
lop, 377 P.2d 520, 524 (N.M. 1962). There is an exception to the informed consent
requirement in "emergency situations" based on the patient's incapacity and the
presumption that the patient would, if physically able, authorize medical treatment.
See Note, Unauthorized Rendition of Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 53 CAL. L. REV.
860 (1965); Note, The Right to Die, 7 Hous. L. Rev. 654 (1970).
33Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632, 1636 (1974).
31 Id. at 1635.
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extension of this doctrine is that the patient has the right to
refuse treatment and to withdraw consent at any time.
The patient's right to an informed consent makes no
sense without a right to an informed refusal. The right to
refuse should be extended to the dying patient, for his deci-
sion on preferred treatment is no different from that involved
in any other medical situation. The individual continues to
know best his own value preferences, capacity for pain and
suffering, and uncompleted business and social obligations.
He remains the optimal cost avoider.3
In contradiction to the statements above are the few cases
in which courts have held that a patient, once he consents to
treatment, submits to the ethics of the attending physician. In
United States v. George"5 the court reviewed an order permit-
ting a hospital to administer blood transfusions which were
contrary to the religious beliefs of the patient. 7 In discussing
the need for respect of the doctor's conscience in such a case,
the court stated that where the patient voluntarily submitted
himself to and insisted upon medical care but simultaneously
sought to dictate to treating physicians a course of treatment
amounting to medical malpractice, it would be unjustifiable to
require the doctors to ignore the mandates of their own consci-
ences, even in the name of free religious exercise. 8 Faced with
a similar situation, the Supreme Court of New Jersey com-
mented that the court should consider "the interest of a hospi-
tal or its staff when the patient is thrust upon them."39 How-
ever, these cases involve the situation in which the patient
desires medical care but insists that care be restricted by refus-
ing to consent to blood transfusions. In the typical passive
euthanasia case, the patient will reject all medical treatment
(except possibly the administration of pain-relieving drugs)
instead of requesting a restricted form of treatment. In addi-
tion, the interests of a physician are not a valid state interest
- Id. at 1648.
14 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965).
31 For a discussion of cases concerning the right to refuse medical treatment based
on the first amendment freedom of religion, see text accompanying notes 74-98.
' 239 F. Supp. at 754.
3, John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 279 A.2d 670, 674 (N.J. 1971).
1977]
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as is required to override an individual's constitutional rights,"0
and are insufficient to justify a violation of the patient's consti-
tutional rights.
Since the patient must consent before he may be treated,
and since he has the power to withdraw that consent, he also
has the power to consent to treatment until specified events
occur.4' A person who must undergo a serious medical operation
has the authority to limit his consent to treatment. That person
may order his physician to discontinue treatment if recovery
from the operation is incomplete and he is in an irreversible
unconscious state. The patient, prior to the operation, must
make it clear to the physician under what circumstances his
consent is withdrawn.
Obviously, circumstances do exist in which the patient
should not be informed of his condition. The physician must
consider the patient's ability to understand the proposed pro-
cedures and his emotional capacity to cope with the conse-
quences of his condition.42 However, there are many instances
in which a patient can comprehend his situation, accept it, and
make a rational decision based on the facts. When such occa-
sions arise, the patient should have the opportunity to refuse
treatment or to specify that his consent to treatment is with-
drawn if certain events occur. 43 This would force the attending
physician to obtain a court order to begin or to continue treat-
ment.44
2. The Living Will
One of the indications of the public's acceptance of eu-
thanasia is the increased popularity of the living will. 45 In es-
11 See text accompanying notes 74-98 for a discussion of the right to refuse medical
treatment on the basis of the first amendment.
4, HEIFETZ, supra note 6, at 29-30.
Id. at 26.
" Some physicians absolutely reject the contention that a patient has the power
to specify that under certain circumstances medical treatment must be withdrawn. For
comments by a physician concerning this issue, see HEIFrZ, supra note 6, at 13-17.
U If consent is withdrawn by the patient, the physician's duty is terminated. For
there to be any criminal liability on the part of the doctor, a duty must exist. Therefore,
when consent is withdrawn, so is the basis for criminal liability. Euthanasia: Criminal,
Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations, supra note 3, at 1208.
,1 When columnist Abigail Van Buren advocated the use of the living will, 40,000
[Vol. 65
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sence this document states that the signatory requests that he
not be kept alive by artificial means or heroic measures if there
is no reasonable expectation of recovery from physical or men-
tal disability." The living will is not meant to have any binding
effect; rather it is an expression of the signatory's wishes. Au-
thorities agree that it has no legal effect,47 though there appears
to be no case law on the subject. Authorities disagree" on
whether a document similar to the living will with a binding
effect on the physician could be written.49
Obviously there are many problems associated with a
document which would legally force a physician to withdraw
life-sustaining procedures from a patient: the doctor would
have to be protected from criminal liability; the performance
of the contract would have to be enforced by a third party if
the signatory were incapacitated; and the terms would have to
be broad enough to cover a number of different situations with-
out being so vague as to be unenforceable." Any problems con-
cerning the criminal liability of the doctor would be resolved
in favor of the doctor's innocence. The document would relieve
the physician from any duty to care for the patient and there
can be no criminal liability absent a duty on the part of the
doctor.51 The problem of having a third party enforce the docu-
ment in the event of the signatory's incapacitation could be
resolved by court appointment of a guardian for that purpose,
or by allowing the signatory to execute a power of attorney for
requests for copies of it were received within two weeks. As of the end of 1973, 300,000
living wills had been distributed. HEIFErz, supra note 6, at 168.
1, For the text of the living will, see The Courier-Journal, Nov. 10, 1975, § A, at
6, col. 1; HEIFETZ, supra note 6, at 37-38.
'1 The Courier-Journal, Nov. 10, 1975, § A, at 6, col. 1; HFEurz, supra note 6, at
38; Vodiga, Euthanasia and the Right to Die-Moral, Ethical and Legal Perspectives,
51 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1, 12 (1974); Note, Antidysthanasia Contracts: A Proposal for
Legalizing Death with Dignity, 5 PAC. L. J. 738, 739 (1974). The California Medical
Society commissioned legal research to study the effects of the living will. The con-
clusion reached was that the document "would probably not carry any weight in
court." Hmzmr, supra note 6, at 38 (citing Los Angeles Medical Association Bulle-
tin, Nov. 15, 1973).
IA Vodiga, supra note 47, at 12.
" HEIFETZ, supra note 6, at 36-38; Note, supra note 47, at 738.
Note, supra note 47, at 740.
', Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations,
supra note 3, at 1208.
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this purpose before incapacitation.12 The problems concerning
vagueness are not substantial, especially in the situation where
the patient is aware in advance that he may become incapaci-
tated due to a specific medical condition. 3
3. Euthanasia Legislation
Legislation in this area could relieve substantially all the
problems in connection with an enforceable living will.-4 Cali-
fornia has recently enacted such a statute." California's Natu-
ral Death Act is a very detailed piece of legislation which ex-
pressly authorizes "the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining procedures. . . from adult patients afflicted with a
terminal condition. . . where the patient has executed a direc-
tive in the form and manner prescribed by the bill."56 The Act
is, however, very limited-before an individual can execute a
directive he must be afflicted with a terminal condition.- Ter-
minal condition is defined as "an incurable condition caused
by injury, disease, or illness, which, regardless of the applica-
tion of life-sustaining procedures, would, within reasonable
medical judgment, produce death, and where the application
of life-sustaining procedures serve [sic] only to postpone the
death of the patient."" The statute requires that the terminal
condition be diagnosed by two physicians.59 The legislation pre-
12 In Kentucky the power of attorney does not cease with the disability of the
principal. Ky. REv. STAT. § 386.093 (1972)[hereinafter cited as KRS].
53 Again the example of a person about to undergo a serious operation is illustra-
tive. See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra. Before the operation the doctor would
be able to predict the possible outcomes, although he might not be able to predict
which one will actually occur. The patient could then decide which outcomes to in-
clude in the document as conditions under which he would no longer wish to be
maintained. Even without the situation in which the patient knows he will be undergo-
ing an operation from which he might not fully recover, it should be possible for a
person to decide under which conditions he does not desire to be maintained by ma-
chines, and to enumerate those situations in a document for use if he is ever ill without
warning.
11 For proposed euthanasia statutes, see HEIFIrZ, supra note 6, at 40-42; Voluntary
Euthanasia: A Proposed Remedy, supra note 3; Note, supra note 47; Kutner, supra
note 14. For a summary of states which have had proposed euthanasia statutes before
their legislatures, see note 10 supra.
5 California Assembly Bill No. 3060, supra note 11.
51 Legislative Counsel's Digest to California Assembly No. 3060, supra note 11.
7 California Assembly Bill No. 3060, supra note 11, § 1 (7187(e)).
M Id. § 1 (7187(f)).
" Id. § 1 (7187(e)).
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vents a rash decision by requiring the patient to state that his
condition was revealed to him by a physician (whose name
must be stated in the directive) at least 14 days before the
signing of the document. 0
The statute provides a number of safeguards for the pa-
tient." The directive can be orally revoked without regard to
the patient's mental state or competency.2 Even if not re-
voked, the document becomes ineffective 5 years from the date
of execution.63 "Any person who willfully conceals, cancels, de-
faces, obliterates, or damages the directive of another" without
the declarant's consent is guilty of a misdemeanor.6 4 Any per-
son who forges the directive of another, or withholds or conceals
knowledge of a revocation, with the intent to cause a withhold-
ing or withdrawing of life-sustaining procedures contrary to the
wishes of the declarant is subject to prosecution for unlawful
homicide. 5
As any legislation concerning this subject must, this bill
insulates the physician and health facility from civil and crimi-
nal liability.6 In addition, the withholding or withdrawing of
life-sustaining procedures in accordance with the Act does not
constitute homicide by express provision of the statute," and
the act of making a directive does not affect life insurance
policies in any way.6
4. The First Amendment and the Refusal of Medical
Treatment
Assuming that a terminally ill patient can in fact force a
" Id. § 1 (7188, "Directive").
, Subsection 7188.5 is a special provision for patients in a "skilled nursing facil-
ity." Id. § 1 (7188.5). The basis for this provision is that some patients in such facilities
are so insulated from a voluntary decision-making role that special steps are required
to assure that the patient is capable of willfully and voluntarily executing a directive.
In order for such a patient validly to execute such a document, one of the witnesses
signing the directive must be a patient advocate or ombudsman designated by the
State Department of Aging. Id.
,1 Id. § 1 (7189).
Id. § 1 (7189.5).
" Id. § 1 (7194).
"Id.
" Id. § 1 (7190).
17 Id. § 1 (7192(a)).
" Id. § 1 (7192(b)).
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doctor to cease treating him, the doctor still may be able to
secure a court order allowing the treatment based on the state's
interest in preserving life. The cases on this subject usually
arise in the context of a patient asserting his first amendment
right to freedom of religion 9 against the physician's assertion
that the state has an interest in preserving life. 0
The first amendment right to religious belief and the free
exercise thereof is dual in nature: a person has the absolute
right to hold any religious belief, however, he has only a quali-
fied right to practice such belief, in that he may only practice
it in a manner that does not violate the rights of others or
contravene the public interest.7' For example, the state may
prohibit the handling of poisonous snakes in religious ceremo-
nies even though only the willing participants are in actual
danger. 2 The state may impose monetary lines on individuals
who because of their religious beliefs refuse to be vaccinated for
certain diseases.73
In re Osborne71 is a case in which a patient successfully
asserted his right to freedom of religion in order to overcome
an action by the hospital seeking a petition for appointment of
a guardian to give consent to the administration of blood trans-
fusions. In that case a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses faith
refused the transfusions for religious reasons. The court found
that the patient understood the consequences of his execution
of a statement refusing the recommended transfusion and
releasing the hospital from liability. The court narrowed the
issues to two critical questions: "(1) has the patient validly
and knowingly chosen this course for his life, and (2) is there
compelling state interest which justifies overriding that
11 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. This first amendment
right is extended to the states by the fourteenth amendment. Cantwell v. Conn., 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
215 (1963).
70 The court in the Quinlan case stated that the circumstances of that case did
not reflect a first amendment freedom of religion question. 355 A.2d at 661.
1, Lawson v. Commonwealth, 164 S.W.2d 972 (Ky. 1942); Annot., 9 A.L.R. 3d
1391, 1393 (1966).
"' Hull v. State, 88 So. 2d 880 (Ala. 1956); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 164 S.W.2d
972 (Ky. 1942).
73 Jacobson v. Mass,, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
74 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972).
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decision?""5 The court answered the first question affirma-
tively. The second question was answered negatively because
the patient's financial resources could provide for sufficient
care for his two children in the event of his death.
The Illinois Supreme Court was faced with a similar situa-
tion in the case of In re Estate of Brooks. 7 The case arose as
an appeal from a circuit court order appointing a conservator
and authorizing him to consent to a blood tranfusion. The pa-
tient had refused transfusions based on her religious beliefs and
had signed a document relieving the physician and hospital
from civil liability. Although the blood transfusion had been
given, the conservator had been discharged, and the case was
moot, the court decided to resolve the issue because of its im-
portance. In holding that the decision of the circuit court was
incorrect, Justice Underwood stated:
It seems to be clearly established that the 'First Amendment
of the United States Constitution as extended to the individ-
ual States by the Fourteenth Amendment to that constitu-
tion, protects the absolute right of every individual to free-
dom in his religious belief and the exercise thereof, subject
only to the qualification that the exercise thereof may pro-
perly be limited by governmental action where such exercise
endangers, clearly and presently, the public health, welfare
or morals. Those cases which have sustained governmental
action as against the challenge that it violated the religious
guarantees of the First Amendment have found the pro-
scribed practice to be immediately deleterious to some phase
of public welfare, health or morality. The decisions which
have held the conduct complained of immune from proscrip-
tion involve no such public injury and no danger thereof.77
Finding no overriding danger to society in not granting the
order to authorize the transfusion, the court criticized the deci-
sion of the lower court: "[W]hat has happened here involves
a judicial attempt to decide what course of action is best for a
particular individual, notwithstanding that individual's con-
trary views based upon religious convictions. Such action can-
not be constitutionally countenanced."78
75 Id. at 375.
74 205 N.E.2d 435 (IM. 1965).
" Id. at 441-42.
7' Id. at 442.
1977]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
In a number of cases the courts have been reluctant to
refuse to grant orders authorizing the medical treatment. Free-
dom of religious belief has been outweighed by the state's inter-
est in cases in which a parent refused to authorize a blood
transfusion for a child.79 The state's interest in maintaining the
life of an unborn child has been held to override the pregnant
mother's right to free exercise of religion," and the state's inter-
est in the welfare of dependent children has been held to over-
ride the rights of the parent.8 In each of these instances it was
held that the state has a valid interest in the welfare of the
child, although in at least one case, In re Osborne,12 this inter-
est was not sufficient because the parent had provided for the
care of the child in the event of his death.
The often-cited case John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital
v. Heston 3 held that the interests of the hospital and its staff,
as well as the state's interest in life, warrant an order authoriz-
ing a blood transfusion despite the patient's refusal." The-court
analogized the situation to that of a person attempting to com-
mit suicide, pointing out that there is no constitutional right
to die.8
If the State may interrupt one mode of self-destruction
[suicide], it may with equal authority interfere with the
other. It is arguably different when an individual, overtaken
by illness, decides to let it run a fatal course. But unless the
79 Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1952); State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751
(N.J. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
1* Raleigh Fitken-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J.
1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964). This decision was rendered before the compan-
ion abortion cases, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973). It is not clear if those cases would change the Anderson holding.
11 In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C.
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972).
279 A.2d 670 (N.J. 1971).
" Apparently the evidence was contradictory on whether the patient actually
expressed a refusal of the transfusion. She was in shock when admitted to the hospital,
and although she later testified that she had expressed her refusal, the attending
physicians and nurses testified that she was incoherent upon admittance or soon there-
after. She executed no release to the hospital. Id. at 671. However, nothing in the
language of the opinion indicates that the decision of the court was affected by this
contradiction of the facts, or that the court would have held differently had it been
clear that she did refuse the transfusion.
Id. at 672.
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medical option itself is laden with the risk of death or of
serious infirmity, the State's interest in sustaining life in such
circumstances is hardly distinguishable from its interest in
the case of suicide.86
The court went on to state that the interests of the physician
and the hospital must also be considered."7
In In re President and Directors of Georgetown College,
Inc.,8" Judge Skelly Wright upheld an order appointing a
guardian with the power to authorize a blood transfusion for a
member of the Jehovah's Witnesses faith who had lost two-
thirds of her body's blood supply from a ruptured ulcer. The
attending physicians determined that she had better than a 50
percent chance to live if the transfusion was administered, but
without the transfusion death would be imminent. Finding
that the patient was not compos mentis at the time consent
was requested, Judge Wright decided that the appointment
was justified. The patient had a 7-month old child, did not
wish to die, and did not believe she would be religiously respon-
sible if the transfusion was given without her consent. On the
basis of these factors, the state had an interest sufficient to
outweigh the exercise of the patient's first amendment rights.
In United States v. George" the court reviewed an order
authorizing a blood transfusion. The court relied heavily on
Judge Wright's opinion in In re President and Directors of
Georgetown College, Inc." and added a new factor to the usual
set of interests which are sufficient to authorize transfusions:
[T]he doctor's conscience and professional oath must also be
respected. In the present case the patient voluntarily submit-
ted himself to and insisted upon medical care. Simultane-
ously he sought to dictate to treating physicians a course of
treatment amounting to medical malpractice. To require
these doctors to ignore the mandates of their own conscience,
even in the name of free religious exercise, cannot be justified
under these circumstances. The patient may knowingly de-
cline treatment, but he may not demand mistreatment."
U Id. at 673.
" Id. at 674.
331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965).
" 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
' 239 F. Supp. at 754.
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Though the interest of the physician should be considered,
it alone is insufficient to override an individual's constitutional
rights, since the physician's interest is not a valid state inter-
est.12 In all cases in which this interest was mentioned, other
valid state interests were present to override the individual's
constitutional rights. The discussion of the physician's inter-
ests in those cases is no more than dicta strengthening the
court's position.
The impact of these decisions is that the right to die based
on freedom of religion is very limited. First, the patient must
have a sincere belief that his religion condemns the treatment
even if it is forced upon him.93 Secondly, the cases which allow
refusal are limited to those situations in which the state's inter-
est is not sufficient to overcome the individual's constitutional
rights. 4
B. Guardianship
It is apparent from the discussion of the doctor-patient
relationship and the refusal of medical treatment based on
freedom of religion that situations will arise where the patient
is incapable of making his own decisions on the refusal of medi-
cal treatment. This could occur any time a person unexpect-
edly becomes mentally incapacitated. The issue that arises in
such situations is whether a guardian may assert the refusal of
treatment for the incapacitated party.
The appointment of guardians is usually governed by stat-
2 t should be noted that in United States v. George the patient bad a dependent
child, giving the state an interest in the patient's life.
,1 The court in In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972), appeared to be impressed
with the fact that the patient believed he would not be allowed to enter the "Bible's
promised new world" if he received a transfusion, even if that transfusion was forced
upon him against his will. Compare that case with United States v. George, 239 F.
Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965), in which the court ordered the transfusion. There the court
pointed out that the patient stated his conscience would be clear if the transfusion was
forced upon him and that he would not resist the doctor's action if the court order was
signed. It appears from these cases that to refuse the transfusion successfully the
patient must have a strong religious conviction against receiving it.
'1 One case indicated the possibility of bringing an action under the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871) for treating a patient in a manner inconsistent with his
religious beliefs under color of state law when there is no compelling state interest to
allow such a violation. Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
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ute. Statutes vary in appointment procedures and powers con-
ferred on the guardian.
In many states, the statutes authorize the appointment
of a guardian of the person, a guardian of property, or a
guardian of both. Unless otherwise specified, a person is
guardian of both the person and the property of his ward.
Different persons may be appointed as guardians of the per-
son and of the property although this should be done only in
exceptional cases. In some states the statutes only authorize
the appointment of a guardian without distinguishing be-
tween guardians of a person and guardians of the property. 5
In most statutes dealing with guardianship, the power of the
guardian does not extend to extraordinary powers such as ter-
minating the life of an incompetent patient. Therefore, where
the scope of the guardianship statute is inadequate, the substi-
tuted judgment doctrine has been utilized. The substituted
judgment doctrine allows the court to act as the incompetent's
supreme guardian by exercising its equitable powers.
Those jurisdictions which have extended the substituted
judgment rule to personal affairs of the incompetent have done
so on the ground that it was in the incompetent's "best inter-
est." The substituted judgment doctrine's extension to the per-
sonal affairs of incompetents has developed trough a series of
organ transplant cases. In 1941, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Bonner v. Moran" implied that "where
consent is obtained from the child's parent, an operation on the
infant for the benefit of another may be performed. ' 7 In three
unreported Massachusetts cases in 195798 the court was con-
fronted with the problem of whether to allow a kidney trans-
plant to one suffering from kidney disease from his healthy
identical twin. In all three of these Massachusetts cases, the
Fraser, Guardianship of the Person, 45 IowA L. REv. 239 (1960).
" 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941). This case dealt with the issue of whether a 15-
year-old boy could consent to a skin graft.
11 Id. at 123. See also Comment, Surgical Transplants-Permission for Performing
a Kidney Transplant Denied as Against Incompetent Donor's Best Interest-In re
Richardson, 5 CuM.-SAM. L. REv. 163, 166 (1975).
" Foster v. Harrison, No. 68674 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Nov. 20, 1957); Huskey
v. Harrison, No. 68666 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Aug. 30, 1957); Masden v. Harrison,
No. 68651 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. June 12, 1957).
" Savage, Organ Transplantation with an Incompetent Donor: Kentucky Re-
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court analyzed the following factors in determining whether to
allow the transplant:
1. The parents must consent as in any medical procedure on
a minor;
2. The minor donor must understand the consequences of
his donation, and give his informed consent, even though
technically, by itself, such consent has no legal validity; and,
3. The transplant must benefit the donor.'
The Massachusetts court emphasized the "benefit" to the
donor as supported by psychiatric testimony.
The case most often cited for extension of the doctrine of
substituted judgment to an incompetent's personal affairs is
Strunk v. Strunk."' In Strunk the Kentucky Court of Appeals
was confronted with the question of whether the court could
properly exercise its equity power to authorize a kidney trans-
plant, parental consent not being a factor.1 2 In this case a 28-
year-old brother had a fatal kidney disease which necessitated
a kidney transplant. A 26-year-old brother, who was mentally
ill and legally incompetent, had no objection to serving as a
donor for the transplant, and the parents were in favor of the
transplant and consented on behalf of the incompetent. The
hospital, however, refused to honor the guardian's consent
since it went beyond the usual powers of a guardian, and re-
quested that the guardian obtain some type of court order au-
thorizing the transplant. The plaintiffs argued that the court
had jurisdiction and authority to allow a transplant which
would be psychologically beneficial to the incompetent
donor. 03 Furthermore, the plaintiffs argued that by denying his
request the court would be compromising his constitutional
rights of due process, equal protection, and security of his per-
son.0 4 The Court of Appeals recognized that this was the first
solves the Dilemma of Strunk v. Strunk, 58 Ky. L.J. 129 (1970). See also Curran, A
Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplantation in Minors, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 891, 892
(1954); Stetter, Kidney Donation from Minors and Incompetents, 35 LA. L. REv. 551
(1975); and Comment, Anatomical Transplants: Legal Developments in Wisconsin, 59
MARQ. L. REv. 605 (1976).
118 Savage, supra note 99, at 136.
101 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969). See also Comment, supra note 97, at 163, 166.
11 445 S.W.2d at 145.
Id. at 146-47.
104 Id. at 147.
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reported case dealing directly with the issue."5 In discussing
the Kentucky guardian statute the Court stated: "Review of
our case law leads us to believe that the power given to a com-
mittee under KRS 387.230 would not extend so far as to allow
a committee to subject his ward to the serious surgical tech-
niques thereunder consideration unless the life of his ward be
in jeopardy."'' 0 Even though the Court did not allow use of the
guardianship -statute, it did recognize the applicability of the
doctrine of substituted judgment. The Court said that in light
of the fact that the transplant would benefit the donor, it would
exercise its authority to substitute its judgment for the benefit
of such persons who are incapable of protecting themselves.107
There was testimony to the effect that had the incompetent's
brother died as a result of the kidney disease, his death would
have had a tremendous psychological impact on the incompe-
tent.' 8 The-Strunk Court decided four to three in favor of the
transplant; the minority based their dissent on the majority's
finding that the transplant would "benefit" the incompetent
donor.10
One authority claims there are two possible ways to inter-
pret the Strunk holding:
In its narrowest construction, Strunk holds that a person
incapable of understanding the procedures may donate a part
of his body for transplantation. This is the first reported case
so holding in the United States. The decision will obviously
have an impact on future cases involving transplants from
incompetents or minors too young to understand or consent.
Id Id. at 149.
'"Id.
' Id. See generally Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substi-
tuted Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. Rav. 48 (1976); Comment, Kidney Trans-
plant-Mentally Incompetent Donor, 35 Mo. L. REv. 538 (1970).
',' 445 S.W.2d at 146.
,, Id. at 150. See also Comment, Spare Parts from Incompetents: A Problem of
Consent, 9 J. oF FAMmY L. 309 (1969); Comment, Transplantation-Incompetent Do-
nors: Was the First Step or the Last Step Taken in Strunk v. Strunk?, 58 CAL.L. Rv.
754 (1970).
An absolute prohibition would obviate the abuses likely to result if parental
consent is deemed sufficient as well as those likely to attend judicial authori-
zation .... The fact that the probable dangers are much less serious than
they potentially could be, or have been, and the little expanded opinions of
emotional trauma which have thus far appeared, seem to be frail reasons for
not erring on the safe side to avoid the danger completely.
Id. at 775.
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In its broadest construction, Strunk holds that a court of
equity has the enormous power to make whatever orders it
may deem necessary for the benefit of those not capable of
looking after themselves. The case is the most recent and
probably the most dramatic example of the doctrine of sub-
stituted judgment in this country. I think it is this latter
construction that frightened the dissenting judges."'
The Court in Strunk was impressed by the fact that all mem-
bers of the incompetent's family requested the transplant."'
Thus, Strunk v. Strunk is important case law today in that it
was the first case in which a court through written opinion
exercised its equitable power of substituted judgment to allow
an organ transplant.
Two organ transplant cases decided after the Strunk deci-
sion adopted the substituted judgment doctrine as applied by
the Kentucky Court of Appeals. In Howard v. Fulton-DeKalb
Hospital Authorities 2 the Georgia Superior Court permitted a
kidney transplant from a mentally retarded donor on the
ground that it would benefit the incompetent. In applying the
doctrine of substituted judgment, the court "determined that
the retarded child would be substantially benefited by permit-
ting her to donate a kidney to her ailing mother."13 In Hart v.
Brown"4 the Connecticut Superior Court also adopted the sub-
stituted judgment doctrine in allowing a kidney transplant.
The court, however, did not emphasize benefit to the minor
donor. Instead the court stressed the potential benefit to the
afflicted twin by a kidney transplant and the presence of paren-
tal consent. "The Hart decision is unique in that the best inter-
est of the minor as donor was not an important factor in the
authorization of the transplant.""'
The generosity of courts in allowing organ transplants from
incompetent donors was attacked by the Louisiana Court of
Appeals in 1973 in the case of In re Richardson."' In Richardson
110 Savage, supra note 99, at 155.
" 445 S.W.2d at 147.
112 42 U.S.L.W. 2322 (Ga. 1973).
M, Comment, supra note 97, at 163.
M 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. 1972).
,,5 Comment, supra note 97, at 167.
HI 284 So. 2d 185 (La. 1973).
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the court said that since the donor was an incompetent and the
transplant was not for his immediate benefit, the court's per-
mission was necessary to proceed with the operation.
Surgical operations for the immediate benefit of the
child must be distinguished from operations upon a child for
the benefit of another person. To perform an operation where
the child receives physical benefit, parental consent is suffi-
cient. However, the issue of whether parental consent is suffi-
cient in an operation for the benefit of another has not yet
been conclusively settled.11 7
The court went on to state that it did not have equitable au-
thority to permit the transplant when it was not for the donor's
benefit."' A similar result was reached by the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin in In re Guardianship of Pescinski.19 The court,
noting that a guardian must act in the best interest of his ward,
stated that there was absolutely no evidence that any interest
of the ward would be served by the transplant."' The opinion
went on to reject the substituted judgment doctrine adopted by
Strunk.
This review of the case law dealing with organ transplants
from incompetent donors indicates that the courts disagree on
when an incompetent will be permitted to serve as a donor for
an organ transplant. In Strunk and Hart the courts emphasized
the benefit to the incompetent and applied the substituted
judgment doctrine. In Richardson and Pescinski the courts ei-
ther failed to find a benefit to the incompetent donor or flatly
rejected the substituted judgment doctrine. It is important to
note, however, that none of these decisions gave the guardian
absolute authority to consent to the organ transplant when the
ward was the donor and not the donee. More important, how-
ever, is the fact that the cases dealing with the guardian's role
in consenting to organ transplants can be analogized to cases
in which a guardian asserts an incompetent's right to refuse
extraordinary life-sustaining procedures.
$17 Comment, supra note 97, at 163, 165.
,R 284 So. 2d 185, 187 (La. 1973). But cf. Comment, supra note 97, at 163, 167-
68.
' 226 N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 1975).
" Id. at 181.
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C. Euthanasia and the Criminal Law
A contention that passive or active euthanasia is legally
acceptable will be met with forceful rebuttal that any such act
is suicide or murder, which are, of course, against the public
interest. 2' One must consider, however, whether the acts in-
volved are technically murder or suicide, and if so, whether the
interests served by making those acts illegal are served by mak-
ing euthanasia illegal.
Criminal law distinguishes a commission from an omis-
sion. An individual is not guilty of a criminal offense unless he
has engaged in conduct which includes a voluntary act or in-
volves an omission to perform a duty which the law imposes
upon him.' Since liability for an omission is based upon a duty
to act and a failure to act, if a conscious patient refuses medical
treatment and the physician does not administer treatment,
the doctor cannot be held criminally liable for the failure to act
because no duty is present. 21
The issue becomes more complicated in the situation in
which treatment is withdrawn or a life-sustaining machine is
turned off. The question then is whether the withdrawal of
medical treatment is a commission (an overt action of with-
drawing medication or turning off a life-sustaining machine) or
an omission (the failure to provide medication or the failure to
allow a life-sustaining machine to continue to maintain the
patient's vital functions). If the withdrawal is an omission, and
the physician has no duty to act because the patient has with-
drawn consent, then clearly the physician is not criminally
21 Suicide was a criminal offense at common law. Commonwealth v. Hicks, 82
S.W. 264, 266 (Ky. 1904); Kutner, supra note 14, at 543. "To the extent anit-suicide
laws remain on the books, they are directed toward authorizing officials to take tempo-
rary custody of the individual to prevent the immediate infliction of harm and to
render psychological assistance." CURRAN & SHAPIRO, LAW, MEDICINE AND FoRENsic
SCIENcE 832 (1970), cited in Cantor, supra note 14, at 246.
2 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(l), (3)(Proposed Official Draft, 1962), KRS §
501.030(1)(1974).
1z Authorities have failed to find a case addressing the question of whether a
physician who fails to take positive steps to prolong the life of a dying patient is guilty
of homicide. Gurney, Is There a Right to Die? - A Study of the Law of Euthanasia, 3
CUM. SAM. L. REv. 235, 248 (1972), cited in Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional
and Legislative Considerations, supra note 3, at 1207; Kasimer, Some Non-Religious
Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 969, 982 n.41
(1958); Silving, supra note 6, at 360.
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liable. On the other hand, if the withdrawal is a commission,
criminal prosecution is possible.
Moving further along the continuum from conduct which
would clearly be an omission through the gray area in which
the conduct could be classified as an omission or a commission,
one reaches conduct which is clearly a commission. This cate-
gory would include actions such as administering a drug to the
patient that hastens death.124 Although juries are reluctant to
find a person guilty of such an action when the victim is a
terminally-ill patient, 25 the defendant is clearly subject to
criminal prosecution.
The conclusion is that if treatment is never given to the
dying patient, and the physician is under no duty to provide
treatment since the patient never gave his consent, the doctor
is not guilty of a criminal act if his behavior is classified as an
omission. If the doctor administers drugs that hasten death, he
is clearly guilty of homicide regardless of the absence of a duty.
The liability of the doctor is not clear if the conduct is between
these two extremes.
I. IN RE QUINLAN
A. The Facts
Karen Ann Quinlan was born on March 29, 1954.128 On the
night of April 15, 1975, "for reasons still unclear,"'27 Karen
apparently ceased breathing for at least two 15-minute peri-
ods. 21 On Karen's admission to nearby Newton Memorial Hos-
2I Two doctors in this country have been charged with first degree murder for such
conduct. Both were acquitted. See text accompanying notes 12-23 supra.
2" See note 19 supra.
In See note 19 supra.
12 In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801, 806 (N.J. Super. 1975). Karen is the adopted
daughter of Joseph and Julia Quinlan and one of three children. See IN THE MATTER
OF KAREN QUINLAN I [hereinafter cited as QuiNLAN I], Plaintiffs Complaint at 2. Karen
was baptized and reared in the Roman Catholic Church and attended elementary and
secondary schools affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. Sometime in late 1974
or early 1975, Karen moved from her parent's home in Landing, New Jersey, and "had
at least two subsequent residences with the last being a lake cottage in Sussex County,
New Jersey." 348 A.2d at 806.
1' 355 A.2d at 653.
In 348 A.2d at 806. The exact length of time she was without spontaneous respira-
tion is unknown. Id. Mouth-to-mouth resusitation was initially applied by friends at
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pital, her condition was described as a "coma of unknown etiol-
ogy."' 29 Urine and blood tests "indicated the presence of quin-
ine, aspirin, barbituates . . . and traces of valium and li-
brium." 30 Karen was unable to breathe spontaneously or inde-
pendently and required a respirator for assistance. 131 Upon re-
view of the medical records, one of the attending physicians
indicated that the drugs found by the blood and urine tests
were within "therapeutic range" and the quinine discovered
was consistent with that used in mixed drinks.1 32
While the cause of the unconsciousness and periodic ceas-
sation of respiration remains undetermined, Karen's comatose
condition was apparently caused by "anoxia," an insufficient
supply of oxygen in the blood.133 On April 25, 1975, when Karen
was transferred to nearby Saint Clare's Hospital, "she was still
unconscious, still on a respirator and a tracheotomy had been
performed. 1 34 Upon arrival at St. Clare's, Karen was admitted
to the Intensive Care Unit where she was placed on an MA-1
respirator.y5
Karen's residence until an ambulance moved her to Newton Memorial Hospital. 355
A.2d at 654.
"9 QUINLAN I, supra note 126, Brief for Guardian ad Litem, at 53. The history "was
essentially incomplete and uninformative." 355 A.2d at 654. Karen was observed to
have normal vital signs, a temperature of 100 degrees, unreactive pupils, unresponsi-
veness to deep pain, a low blood oxygen level, and her legs in a rigid curled position,
348 A.2d at 806-07.
'' 348 A.2d at 806.
"' Id. at 807.
3 Id. at 806.
' Id.
"' 355 A.2d at 654.
"= 348 A.2d at 807. The MA-1 respirator is designed to ensure that a controlled
volume of air passes into the lungs and will completely take over the breathing function
should the patient cease to breathe spontaneously. Id. Some 300 tests were performed
to determine the basis for Karen's condition, including an electroncephalogram
(EEG), a brain scan, an angiogram, and a lumbar puncture. 355 A.2d at 654. The brain
scan, angiogram, and lumbar puncture were all normal in result; however, the elec-
troencephalogram indicated an abnormal electrical rhythm of the brain, which one of
the physicians indicated to be "consistent with her clinical state." QUINLAN I, supra
note 126, Trial Record at 218. Dr. Morse indicated that Karen was originally in a sleep-
like unresponsive condition which subsequently developed into a "sleep-wake cycle,"
a normal improvement for a patient in a comatose state. Id. at 222. Dr. Morse de-
scribed the cycles as follows:
[Wihen Karen was originally seen, she was more in a condition like
sleep-like unresponsiveness. When I transferred her to St. Clare's she was in
that same condition. But as time came on, she switched from a position-she
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Upon learning of Karen's condition, the Quinlan family
hoped for improvement though the doctors appeared pessimis-
tic. "' 5 Karen's parents visited her bedside twice daily 37 and had
developed what we call sleep-wake cycles. Now a person can have these
sleep-wake cylces and still be in a coma. Again, "coma" is the lack of con-
sciousness. So you can be awake and still be unresponsive to your environ-
ment.
I mean she has her eyes open. She blinks, and things of that sort, which
is the arousability factor of the coma. But a person-if you and I and the
other attorneys were standing there, it is my impression, and even the at-
tending doctors', from watching her on a daily basis and even feeding her,
that a rudimentary supportive mechanism such as getting your food-when
you go to the zoo, the animals will come over to you by instinct. Karen
doesn't even follow the act of hanging the IV bottle up to get her food, and
to me-many other things that we have observed, on an ongoing basis you
know-.
Id.
Although Karen has been observed to blink or cry out during the awake cycle, she
is still unconscious and "totally unaware of anyone and anything around her." 355 A.2d
at 654. The daily chart maintained by a 24-hour nursing staff indicated the following
record as it pertained to Karen's "vital signs":
1. Her color was generally pale, her skin warm; she was almost constantly
suffering from diaphoresis (sweating), many times profusely but occasionally
moderately or not at all;
2. There was always a reaction to painful stimuli, she responded decere-
brately to pain, she sometimes would grimice as if in pain, which would
be followed by increased rigidity of her arms and legs;
3. There would be periodic contractions and spasms, periodic yawning,
periodic movements of spastic nature;
4. Pupils were sometimes dilated, sometimes normal, but almost always
sluggish to light;
5. Body waste disposal through the urethral catheter and the bowel was
indicated to occur;
6. Feedings of Vivinex were given alternately with water on various nurses
[sic] shifts;
7. The nurses were constantly moving, positioning and bathing her;
8. Body rashes occurred at times; decubiti were treated with heat lamps on
occasions;
9. Sometimes she would trigger and assist the respirator; other times she
would go for periods without triggering it at all;
10. Her extremities remained rigid with contraction of them being de-
scribed as severe at times;
11. On May 7 nurses indicated she blinked her eyes two times when asked
to and appeared responsive by moving her eyes when talked to, but there is
no further evidence of this type reaction thereafter.
348 A.2d at 808-09.
" COLEN, supra note 2, at 31. Joseph Quinlan testified that Dr. Morse had contin-
ously told the family not to get their hopes up and that Dr. Morse had stated that even
if by some miracle Karen should survive, he would never take her home; she would
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frequent conferences with Dr. Morse, Karen's attending physi-
cian, and Dr. Arshad Javed, the attending pulmonary internist
who assisted Dr. Morse. Karen's condition deteriorated during
the months following her admission to the hospital and she
suffered a weight loss of over 40 pounds.'38 Attempts to wean
Karen from the respirator were unsuccessful.'39 As the months
passed without encouragement of recovery or even improve-
ment, the Quinlan family entertained the proposition that
Karen should be disconnected from the MA-1 respirator and
allowed a natural death. The decision by the family to allow
Karen to die was not made until July 1975, some 3 months
following Karen's hospitalization.' 4' The Quinlan family sought
and received the support of their priest in the decision.'4 ' In a
series of meetings attended by the Quinlans, Drs. Morse and
Javed, and the hospital officials, the Quinlans said they were
led to believe that their request would be granted "if a preced-
ent could be found for doing sO.' '142 The hospital and doctors
then changed their minds, requiring the Quinlans to present a
written release before any action would be taken to discontinue
the use of the respirator.' 43 On July 31, 1975, the Quinlans
signed a written consent authorizing the discontinuance of all
spend the remainder of her life in an institution. QUINLAN I, supra note 126, Trial
Record at 361.
,37 COLEN, supra note 2, at 31.
'3 355 A.2d at 655.
139 Id.
24' QUINLAN I, supra note 126, Trial Record at 362. As Joseph Quinlan explained
at trial, the other members of the family had already arrived at their decision to allow
Karen to die naturally when he finally reached his decision. COLEN, supra note 2, at
31. Joseph Quinlan swore under oath in court that it was Dr. Javed, the pulmonary
internist, who first suggested withdrawing the use of the respirator. Id. at 34. Dr.
Javed, however, "swore under oath that he had only suggested an attempt be made to
'wean' Karen off the machine." Id.
"I To confirm the moral rightness of the decision he was about to make
he consulted with his parish priest and later with the Catholic chaplain at
St. Clare's Hospital. He would not, he testified, have sought termination [of
the machine] if that act were to be morally wrong or in conflict with the
tenets of the religion he so profoundly respects. He was disabused of doubt,
however, when the position of the Roman Catholic Church was made known
to him as it is reflected in the record of this case.
355 A.2d at 658.
, ' COLEN, supra note 2, at 35.
143 Id.
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extraordinary measures"' and releasing the physicians and the
hospital "from any and all liability." '45 The Quinlans went
home that night resolved that the machine would be removed
the next day.'46 The doctors and the hospital again had a
change of heart and stated that nonwithstanding the release,
they would not withdraw the respirator.47 Dr. Morse testified
that "[a]fter checking on other medical case histories he con-
cluded that to terminate the respirator would be a substantial
deviation from medical tradition, that it involved ascertaining
'quality of life', and that he would not do so."' S At this point,
Drs. Morse and Ja~ed, along with the hospital, stated that they
would terminate the use of the respirator only if the Quinlans
could have themselves appointed as Karen's guardians. ' To
comply with this requirement, the Quinlans were forced to seek
the approval of the judiciary through a guardianship proceed-
ing.
On September 10, 1975, Joseph Quinlan filed in the Supe-
rior Court of New Jersey a petition requesting that Karen be
adjudged mentally incompetent and that he be appointed
Karen's guardian "with the express power of authorizing the
discontinuance of all extraordinary means of sustaintaing the
vital processes of his daughter . . ... "I In response to Joseph
Quinlan's petition, Judge Robert Muir appointed Daniel Cob-
urn as Guardian ad Litem of Karen to represent her in the
action.' 1 On September 16, 1975, Joseph Quinlan filed a sup-
plemental complaint which reiterated his earlier petition and
'" 348 A.2d at 813-14. The contents of the release signed by the Quinlans is as
follows:
We authorize and direct Doctor Morse to discontinue all extraordinary
measures, including the use of a respirator for our daughter Karen Quinlan.
We acknowledge that the above named physician has thoroughly dis-
cussed the above with us and that the consequences have been fully ex-
plained to us. Therefore, we hereby RELEASE from any and all liability the
above named physician, associates and assistants of his choice, Saint Clare's
Hospital and its agents and employees.
Id.
'' Id.
' QUINLAN I, supra note 126, Trial Record at 364.
"' CoLEN, supra note 2, at 35.
"' 348 A.2d at 814.
"' CoLEN, supra note 2, at 35.
SQuINLAN I, supra note 126, Plaintiff's Complaint at 3.
SQUINLAN I, supra note 126, Order Appointing Guardian ad Litem at 11.
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additionally sought to have the court permanently enjoin the
Morris County prosecutor "from interference with or criminal
prosecution arising out of any relief" granted by the court. 5 '
The supplemental complaint also requested that the court per-
manently enjoin Dr. Morse, Dr. Javed and St. Clare's Hospital
from interference with any relief granted by the court. 153 Judge
Muir ordered the Morris County Prosecutor, Donald Collester,
Jr., Dr. Morse, Dr. Javed, and St. Clare's Hospital to show
cause why an order sustaining Joseph Quinlan's complaint
should not be entered. On September 22, 1975, after the prose-
cutor, physicians, and hospital presented arguments to the
court against the granting of the relief sought by Joseph Quin-
lan, Judge Muir set October 20, 1975, as the trial date.
Trial briefs were submitted by all parties involved in the
litigation. Counsel for Joseph Quinlan contended that the
"courts of New Jersey and other jurisdictions have not hesi-
tated to decide cases challenging the administration of life-
sustaining medical treatment" and that the court is empow-
ered through a declaratory judgment action to appoint a guard-
ian for the incompetent."4 The petitioners further argued that
denial of the relief sought would violate the constitutionally
protected rights of Karen and her family.55 The petitioners
argued that denial of the relief sought would interfere with the
free exercise of the Quinlan's religious beliefs as protected by
the first amendment and would constitute imposition of "cruel
and unusual punishment" which is prohibited by the eighth
amendment. '56 The petitioners did reverse their position that
Karen was legally dead. 5 7 Briefs were also submitted by the
Guardian ad Litem, the New Jersey Attorney General, counsel
for Drs. Morse and Javed, the Morris County Prosecutor, and
St. Clare's Hospital." 8 In general, the briefs submitted by the
,52 QUINLAN I, supra note 126, Plaintiff's Supplemental Complaint at 14.
153 Id.
" QUINLAN I, supra note 126, Brief for Plaintiff at 36.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 43, 48.
,5 Id. at 50. Joseph Quinlan initially asserted that Karen was legally dead; how-
ever, this contention was dropped at the pretrial conference. 355 A.2d at 652.
'0' The Attorney General of New Jersey intervened in the litigation as a matter of
right pursuant to R. 4:33-1 on behalf of the State of New Jersey. 355 A.2d at 651.
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opponents to Joseph Quinlan's petition presented the following
arguments:
1. Even though the court has jurisdiction to appoint Joseph
Quinlan as permanent guardian for Karen, the court should
appoint someone other than Joseph Quinlan;"'
2. Since there is no support in the law which entitles the
plaintiffs to the relief sought when the incompetent is alive,
the complaint should be dismissed as a matter of law since
it is undisputed that Karen is not legally dead;'60
3. The relief sought by the petitioners violates the homicide
laws of New Jersey;"' and
4. The denial of the relief sought by the petitioners would
not be in violation of Karen's constitutionally protected right
of free exercise of religion, right of privacy, and the right
against imposition of cruel and unusual punishment.'62
The New Jersey Attorney General specifically argued that the
court should not enjoin a hypothetical prosecution. 1 3 Counsel
representing St. Clare's Hospital argued that "in the event that
the relief sought by the plaintiff is granted, neither the hospital
nor its employees, nor the doctors should be directed to discon-
tinue the respirator."'' 4 Thus, from the arguments developed
by the trial briefs, it appeared there would be a constitutional
confrontation.
B. The Trial Court's Holding
The trial began on October 20, 1975, and concluded 7 days
later.'65 On November 10, 1975, Judge Muir rendered his writ-
"' See generally QUINLAN I, supra note 126, Brief on Behalf of Guardian ad Litem
at 52, Brief on Behalf of Attorney General of New Jersey at 80, and Brief on Behalf of
Dr. Arshad Javed and Dr. Robert J. Morse at 117.
110 See generally QuINLAN I, supra note 126, Brief on Behalf of Guardian ad Litem
at 52, Brief on Behalf of the Attorney General of New Jersey at 80, and Brief on Behalf
of the Morris County Prosecutor at 155.
"I See generally QUINLAN I, supra note 126, Brief on Behalf of the Morris County
Prosecutor at 151.
112 See generally QUINLAN I, supra note 126, Brief on Behalf of the Guardian ad
Litem at 52.
'" QUINLAN I, supra note 126, Brief on Behalf of the Attorney General of New
Jersey at 80.
"' QUINLAN I, supra note 126, Brief on Behalf of St. Clare's Hospital at 178.
'n During the course of the trial, the court heard the testimony of Joseph and Julia
Quinlan and their daughter, Mary Ellen. In addition to the testimony of Drs. Morse
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ten opinion. The opinion first dealt with the plaintiffs' conten-
tion that the court had "the inherent power of an equity court"
to act as protector and guardian of all persons under a disabil-
ity.6' The court responded by stating:
The breadth of the power to act and protect Karen's
interest is, I conclude, controlled by a judicial conscience and
morality which dictate the determination whether or not
Karen Ann Quinlan be removed from the respirator is to be
left to the treating physician. It is a medical decision, not a
judicial one. I am satisfied that it may be concurred in by the
parents but not governed by them. This is so because there
is always the dilemma of whether it is the conscious being's
relief or the unconscious being's welfare that governs the par-
ental motivation. 67.
The court went further to state that the court has power over
a person suffering from a disability to protect and aid his best
interests. Judge Muir declared that "[tihe single most impor-
tant temporal quality Karen Ann Quinlan has is life."'' 8 The
court concluded that it would not authorize the taking of
Karen's life. The court noted that an equity court cannot su-
persede or abrogate positive statutory law.' Although New
Jersey's homicide laws are based on common law principles,
the court stated that decisions from other jurisdictions which
have codified the common law are "dispositive of the manner
in which this State would treat like circumstances. 1 70
and Javed, five other physicians were called upon for medical testimony. Father
Thomas J. Trapasso, the Quinlan's priest and close friend, testified that the Roman
Catholic Church would not disapprove of the judicial relief sought by the Quinlans.
QUINLAN I, supra note 126, Trial Record at 395-96. The plaintiffs also called Father
Pascal Caccavale, the chaplain of St. Clare's Hospital, to testify as to the Roman
Catholic Church's position on the discontinuance of extraordinary medical means
when the "patient has reached a point beyond medical knowledge to effectively help
this person." Id. at 413. The court also heard from Lori Gaffney, a good friend of
Karen's who testified that' Karen had once said to her that "she would not want to be
kept alive by machines, under any circumstances." Id. at 448.
"' 348 A.2d at 816.
" Id. at 819. The language used by Judge Muir is unfortunate in that it is difficult
to interpret the meaning of "judicial conscience." In the next sentence in the opinion,
the court expressly declares that the decision is of a medical rather than a judicial
nature. Thus, one can only speculate that Judge Muir meant the exercise of discretion
where he wrote "judicial conscience."
I" Id. at 820.
1"9 Id.
170 Id.
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The court declined the hospital's request for determina-
tion of whether the use of the definition of clinical death devel-
oped by the Harvard Medical School in 1968 is in accordance
with "ordinary and standard medical practice."1 71 The court
avoided this question by stating that "[w]hether Karen Quin-
lan one day becomes brain-dead and therefore should be re-
moved from the respirator is a decision that will have to be
based upon the extant ordinary medical criteria at the time."' 72
The Superior Court next dealt with the constitutional is-
sues raised by the plaintiffs. As to the right of privacy argu-
ment developed in Griswold v. Connecticut,73 the court ex-
plained:
It is not significant to this opinion whether the right of
self-determination is within the scope of the right of privacy.
What is significant is the extent to which it is subject to a
compelling state interest. . . and whether the right can be
exercised by the parent for his child."4
The court stated that "[tihe compelling state interest found
lacking in Wade, Baird, Griswold and Stanley is''175 present in
this situation, in that the state has an "interest in preservation
of life and the extension of the court's protection to an incom-
petent.''7 The court further declared "[t]here is no constitu-
tional right to die that can be asserted by a parent for his
incompetent adult child.' ' 77 As to the plaintiffs' argument that
the right to die is a religious belief protected by the Free Exer-
cise Clause, the court responded by stating that although
"[r]eligious beliefs are absolute under the Free Exercise
Clause, [the] practice in pursuit thereof is not free from gov-
'M' Id. at 820-21. Both the treating physicians and St. Clare's Hospital, in claiming
Karen was not brain-dead, referred to the Ad Hoc Committee of Harvard Medical
School report on brain death. The criteria established by the report are set out in
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition
of Brain Death: A Definition of "Irreversible Coma," 205 J.A.M.A. 337 (1968).
M 348 A.2d at 821.
173 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
'1 348 A.2d at 821.
'13 Id. at 822. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Ga., 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
"' 348 A.2d at 822.
Id.
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ernmental regulation."'' 8 The court distinguished a line of
cases which upheld parental standing to assert religious beliefs,
stating that those cases dealt with the "future life conduct of
their children, not the ending of life."'79 Judge Muir summarily
disposed of the plaintiffs' claim that the use of futile extraordi-
nary measures constituted "cruel and unusual punishment" by
declaring that the eighth amendment is not applicable to civil
actions. 18 0
In evaluating the evidence and law presented, the court
held that the questions surrounding the care and treatment of
Karen were medical in nature and should be resolved by physi-
cians, not the courts. The court did recognize that there would
be instances "relating to further treatment that will require a
guardian's counsel, advice and concurrence.' ' ' Judge Muir
stated that although there was no reason why Joseph Quinlan
should not serve as guardian, Mr. Quinlan would not be ap-
pointed in order to avoid burdening him with the anguish of
day-by-day decisions as to future care and treatment of his
daughter.' 2 The court accordingly appointed an independent
guardian. Clearly the trial court recognized no right to die.
Some believe that Judge Muir "should have . . . end[ed] the
matter by ruling that the questions involved were such that
they should have been settled by the Quinlans and Karen's
physicians," without being forced into a trial situation.'13
C. The Appellate Court's Holding
The Quinlans appealed to the New Jersey Supreme
Court,'84 which affirmed the trial court as to the contention
that the Free Exercise Clause'85 and the Cruel and Unusual
Id.
,7 Id. at 823.
'' Id. at 823-24.
' Id. at 824.
182 Id.
"' COLEN, supra note 2, at 54. Although the court did decide on the constitution-
ality of one's right to die, the decision "set off a wave of confusion and near panic
among those who practice emergency medicine by declaring that decisions to end life-
sustaining treatment are medical decisions, but a physician who makes such a deci-
sion, and acts on it, risks being charged with murder if the patient dies." Id.
'81 355 A.2d 647.
"1 Id. at 661.
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Punishment Clause' 6 do not constitutionally protect one's
right to die. The court did, however, reverse the lower court's
holding and declared that one does have a right to die based
on his constitutional right of privacy.' 7 The court based its
holding on the lack of any compelling state interest."" On the
issue of naming Joseph Quinlan as guardian of Karen's person,
the New Jersey Supreme Court also reversed. The court held
that under these circumstances, the only way to protect
Karen's right of privacy would be to allow that right to "be
asserted in her behalf. . . by her guardian."' 8'
The court emphasized the impact of its holding on the
medical profession. The New Jersey Supreme Court attacked
with vigor the trial court's reluctance to address the dilemma
involving the doctor's responsibility and the relationship of the
court's duty by stating:
Such notions as to the distribution of responsibility,
heretofore generally entertained, should however neither
impede this Court in deciding matters clearly justiciable nor
preclude a re-examination by the Court as to underlying
human values and rights. Determinations as to these must,
in the ultimate, be responsive not only to the concepts of
medicine but also to the common moral judgment of the com-
munity at large. In the latter respect the Court has a nonde-
legable judicial responsibility.
Put in another way, the law, equity and justice must not
themselves quail and be helpless in the face of modem tech-
nological marvels presenting questions hitherto unthought of.
Where a Karen Quinlan, or a parent, or a doctor, or a hospi-
tal, or a State seeks the process and response of a court, it
must answer with its most informed conception of justice in
the previously unexplored circumstances presented to it.
That is its obligation and we are here fulfilling it, for the
actors and those having an interest in the matter should not
go without remedy."'
The court noted that "[u]nder the law as it then stood,
Judge Muir was correct in declining to authorize withdrawal of
' Id. at 662.
' Id. at 662-63.
' Id. at 663.
'A' Id. at 664.
" Id. at 665-66.
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the respirator."' 9 ' The court, however, stated that the "medical
judgment" standard adopted by the trial court did little to
relieve the physicians from the pressure of civil and criminal
liability. As discussed in the appellate court's decision:
[Tjhere must be a way to free physicians, in the pursuit of
their healing vocation, from possible contamination by self-
interest or self-protection concerns which would inhibit their
independent medical judgments for the well-being of their
dying patients. We would hope that this opinion might be
serviceable to some degree in ameliorating the professional
problems under discussion."'
Thus, the court established a new standard which provided:
Upon the concurrence of the guardian and family of Karen,
should the responsible attending physicians conclude that
there is no reasonable possibility of Karen's ever emerging
from her present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient
state and that the life-support apparatus now being adminis-
tered to Karen should be discontinued, they shall consult
with the hospital "Ethics Committee" or like body of the
institution in which Karen is then hospitalized. If that con-
sultative body agrees that there is no reasonable possibility
of Karen's ever emerging from her present comatose condi-
tion to a cognitive, sapient state, the present life-support
system may be withdrawn and said action shall be without
any civil or criminal liability therefor on the part of any par-
ticipant, whether guardian, physician, hospital or others."'
The court additionally stated that the remedy provided by this
decision would not constitute homicide." 4 The opinion empha-
sized that judicial approval to confirm such medical decisions
is unnecessary and "inappropriate, not only because [it]
would be a gratuitous encroachment upon the medical profes-
sion's field of competence, but because it would be impossibly
cumbersome."'"5
In summary, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision is
important on four points: First, it implements a standard
"' Id. at 666.
,, Id. at 668.
" Id. at 671-72.
"' Id. at 669.
", Id.
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which physicians can follow without the threat of civil or crimi-
nal liability; second, it states expressly that judicial confirma-
tion of such decisions would generally be inappropriate; third,
it recognizes the right to die as being constitutionally protected
by the right of privacy; and fourth, it devises a standard by
which the guardian and family can exercise the incompetent's
right to die. Although the importance of the Quinlan case can-
not be denied, it should be noted that none of the parties intend
to seek review in the United States Supreme Court.'
1. Criminal Liability of the Physicians
Unquestionably the state does have an interest in preserv-
ing life, based upon an interest in the preservation of society,
the sanctity of life, the preservation of public morals, the pro-
tection of the individual from himself, and the protection of
third parties.'97 Without mentioning the public interest in pre-
serving life, the Quinlan decision adequately dispensed with
the problem of criminal liability with alternative arguments:
the ensuing death would not be homicide but rather expiration
from existing natural causes; and even if it were to be regarded
as homicide, it would not be unlawful."'
The court did not discuss its statement that the death
would not be homicide but rather expiration from existing nat-
ural causes. On its face this statement appears valid, but in
exploring possible variations of the Quinlan situation, its flaws
become evident. Suppose the facts in Quinlan were that Karen
could return to her previous full physical capacity after a pe-
"I Following the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision to allow the Quinlans to
exercise Karen's constitutional right to die, the Quinlans asked the treating physicians,
Drs. Morse and Javed, to turn off the MA-1 respirator. Even with the New Jersey
Supreme Court's decision, the doctors and St. Clare's hospital refused to discontinue
the use of the respirator. The Quinlans spent 3 months searching for a medical institu-
tion which would accept Karen as a patient and would comply with the Quinlan's
request to discontinue the respirator. On June 9, 1976, the Morris View Nurisng Home,
a publicly-operated nursing facility for indigents, admitted Karen as a patient. On
June 10, 1976, counsel for Morris View announced that the ethics committee had
approved the Quinlans' request to permit Karen to die a natural death without the
use of a respirator. At the date of this writing, some 28 months after Karen was first
placed on the respirator and some 13 months since the respirator was disconnected,
Karen is still alive. COLEN, supra note 2.
"' Cantor, supra note 14, at 242-54.
", 355 A.2d at 669-70.
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riod of time and could lead a normal life without depending on
machines. If the machines had been turned off under these
circumstances, she would die of natural causes. This would
appear to be murder although within the area which the court
classified as not being murder. The same problem would occur
if a patient with kidney damage was not allowed periodic use
of a dialysis machine. Without the machine that person would
die of natural causes, but no one would question that this act
would constitute murder. Considering these possibilities, it
appears that the first alternative of the court is weak.
The second alternative-even if the act were regarded as
homicide, it would not be unlawful-is more persuasive. The
court first used a definitional basis. The termination of treat-
ment pursuant to the right to privacy is ipso facto lawful. Thus
the act would not come within the scope of homicide statutes
which proscribe only the unlawful killing of another.
Next the court contended that "the exercise of a constitu-
tional right .. . is protected from criminal prosecution.", 99
Basing that theory on the United States Supreme Court case
Stanley v. Georgia, 2 1 the court stated:
We do not question the State's undoubted power to punish
the taking of human life, but that power does not encompass
individuals terminating medical treatment pursuant to their
right of privacy. The constitutional protection extends to
third parties whose action is necessary to effectuate the exer-
cise of that right where the individuals themselves would not
be subject to prosecution or the third parties are charged as
accessories to an act which could not be a crime. And, under
the circumstances of this case, these same principles would
apply to and negate a valid prosecution for attempted suicide
were there still such a crime in this State.2 11
Retracing the reasoning of the court in this area, initially
two unlawful acts had to be explained away: murder and sui-
cide.2 12 Both areas can be dispensed with by the reasoning of
the court. Basically the court stated that since a constitutional
"' Id. at 670.
394 U.S. 557 (1969).
201 355 A.2d at 670 (footnotes omitted).
202 As the court explained, suicide was an offense at common law, although it is
not a "crime" under New Jersey law at this time. Id. at n.9.
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right is being protected, the act is not unlawful and therefore
does not constitute murder. Actually, the court plays a word
game in an attempt to circumvent the state penal code, which
makes no mention of the fact that a person may lawfully com-
mit homicide.203 The second part of the analysis, based on
Stanley v. Georgia, is better reasoned. That is, even though the
conduct is unlawful, it is protected from criminal prosecution.
One has to admire the court for facing this issue so di-
rectly. It could have defined the conduct of the physicians as
an omission, and since no duty would exist once the guardian
demanded that the machines be turned off, the physicians
would be free from criminal liability. However, the court re-
fused to use this line of reasoning and faced the issue.0 4
2. Guardianship and the Equity Power of the Court
As mentioned earlier, Joseph Quinlan was required to
bring legal action to be appointed legal guardian of his daugh-
ter. In Mr. Quinlan's petition for guardianship, he additionally
requested the Chancery Court to exercise its equity power and
grant him the express authority, as guardian, to discontinue
the use of "extraordinary" medical measures. 25 The petition
requested that the court enjoin the physicians and hospital
from interfering with the decree of the court as well as enjoining
the state from bringing criminal charges. 26 Thus,
Joseph Quinlan has not only asked the court for a determina-
tion as to general fitness; he is also praying the court, parens
patriae and therefore supreme guardian, to determine that a
proposed action is in the best interests of the incompetent,
Karen Ann Quinlan, and to authorize the taking of that pro-
posed action.0 7
Counsel for Joseph Quinlan argued that the principles
enumerated in Strunk and Hart would apply in the right to die
context. The plaintiff argued that under the substituted judg-
ment doctrine as applied by Strunk and Hart, the court could
26 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:113-2 (1965).
'' For a discussion of the criminality of euthanasia, see Silving, supra note 6.
QUINLAN I, supra note 126, Plaintiff's Complaint at 3.
2" Id. at 14.
"' QUINLAN I, supra note 126, Trial Brief for Plaintiff at 40.
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exercise its equitable powers to protect Karen's best inter-
ests.2 °1 The petition prayed that Karen's best interest would be
served by terminating extraordinary medical means. 219 Judge
Muir responded to the plaintiff's arguments by stating:
It is also noted the concept of the Court's power over a person
suffering under a disability is to protect and aid the best
interests. As pointed out, the Hart and Strunk cases deal
with protection as it relates to the future life of the infants
or incompetent. Here the authorization sought, if granted,
would result in Karen's death. The natural processes of her
body are not shown to be sufficiently strong to sustain her by
themselves. The authorization, therefore, would be to permit
Karen Quinlan to die. This is not protection. It is not some-
thing in her best interests, in a temporal sense, and it is in a
temporal sense that I must operate whether I believe in life
after death or not. The single most important temporal qual-
ity Karen Ann Quinlan has is life. This Court will not author-
ize that life to be taken from her.210
Thus, the trial court held that since there was no constitutional
right to die, the court through its equitable powers could not
create such a right. From the language of the opinion, however,
it is evident that Judge Muir would not have allowed the sub-
stituted judgment doctrine to apply even if he had found a
constitutional right to die.21'
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court took a different
approach to the "right to die" issue. The court, in reversing the
trial court, held that an individual does have a constitutional
right to die under some circumstances. The court further stated
that "[t]he only practical way to prevent destruction of the
right is to permit the guardian and family of Karen to
render their best judgment, subject to qualifications herein-
after stated, as to whether she would exercise it in these cir-
cumstances. 2 12 The New Jersey Supreme Court expressly
stated that this decision does not imply that a proceeding for
judicial relief is necessarily required for the implementation of
=8 Id. at 41.
2o Id.
211 348 A.2d at 819-20.
211 Id. at 820.
212 355 A.2d at 664.
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comparable decisions in the field of medical practice.213 Thus,
from the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion, it appears that
the court is rejecting the application of the substituted judg-
ment doctrine. The court, while stating that the guardian could
assert the incompetent's "right to die," however, did restrict
the guardian's power to assert the right. The opinion limited
the guardian's power to assert the right to die on behalf of the
ward to "these circumstances"21 or "comparable decisions. '215
The court stated that the "guardian and family" of Karen shall
be allowed to consent to discontinuance of the life-support ap-
paratus "should the attending physicians conclude that there
is no reasonable possibility of Karen's ever emerging from her
present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state" and
the hospital "Ethics Committee" agrees. 2 1 Thus, the decision
grants to the guardian the authority to exercise an incompe-
tent's "right to die" once an irreversible condition has been
verified and confirmed and the guardian's power need not be
judicially affirmed by the court. Accordingly, Joseph Quinlan
was appointed guardian of Karen's person with the powers
prayed for but subject to the restrictions set out by the court.
H. THE FOUNDATION OF QUINLAN-THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
OF PRIVACY
A. Development of the Right of Privacy
One of the fundamental tenets of American jurisprudence
is that if an act of a private citizen can in no way injure society
or any third person, it is a right. It is against this background
that the right to privacy should be examined. Although this
phrase is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, it is
implicit in many of the provisions and the philosophical back-
ground out of which the Constitution was formulated. Justice
Brandeis articulated the theory of private rights in his dissent
in Olmstead v. United States:21
7
"' Id. at 671.
214 Id. at 664.
',' Id. at 671.
" See generally Steele & Hill, A Plea for a Legal Right to Die, 29 OKLA. L. REV.
328 (1976).
217 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure condi-
tions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized
the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings, and
of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, plea-
sure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material
things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men." '1
"The right to be let alone" is the underlying theme of the Bill
of Rights. It is the "fertile soil for the cultivation of individual
freedom.""'
The definition of privacy varies with each individual, but
it is clear this right includes such protection as freedom from
unwanted intrusion and unwanted publicity, and a right to
"intimacy." Additionally, the right to privacy includes free-
dom from physical, mental, or spiritual violation and a right
to the integrity of one's personality. 20 Yet due to the varieties
and uncertainties of an everyday definition of privacy, prob-
lems arise when attempting to define legally the boundaries of
a right of privacy. The concept of a common law right of pri-
vacy was developed by Frank Warren and Louis Brandeis in
1890 when they published their famous article "The Right to
Privacy. ' 221 The authors concluded that only by embracing a
broad right to an inviolate personality could the individual's
privacy be protected. 22
The issue here revolves around privacy as a constitutional
2S Id. at 478.
2,, Griswold, The Right to Be Let Alone, 55 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 216, 217 (1960). See
also Dykstra, The Right Most Valued by Civilized Man, 6 UTAH L. REv. 305 (1959),
where Dean Daniel Dykstra discusses this right comprehensively.
rs Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 CoLum. L. Rav. 1410 (1974).
21 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAnv. L. REv. 193 (1890). The
authors were concerned with the problem of the press "overstepping in every direction
the obvious bounds of propriety and decency." Id. at 196. They wanted to formulate a
standard to protect individual privacy. They traced the early common law cases which
recognized the right of every man "to keep his sentiments, if he pleases" and the right
"to judge whether he will make them public or commit them only to the sight of his
friends," Miller v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 242 (1769), cited in Warren & Brandeis,
supra at 198 n.2.
Warren & Brand~is, supra note 221, at 211.
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right; the question is whether a particular private interest is so
important as to be declared fundamental and therefore granted
the protection of a strict scrutiny approach.22 Even if privacy
is narrowly defined, the Constitution specifically protects some
elements. The fourth amendment provides that the "right of
the People to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable search and seizure shall not be
violated." Some might include under the right to privacy a
person's right under the fifth amendment not to be compelled
to be a witness against himself. 24 Yet even the privacies long
protected by the Constitution are not, of course, absolute. The
public good permits searches and seizures with a warrant, and
sometimes, "if reasonable," on probable cause without a war-
rant. Self-incriminating testimony can also be compelled if the
witness is given immunity from prosecution. 25 The problem
facing the courts now is the proper identification of the bound-
aries and content of the right of privacy. 26
The emerging concept of privacy21 undoubtedly gives con-
stitutional dimension to the individual's asserted right to con-
trol his body. The fourth amendment has long been a basis for
the "right to be let alone. ' 228 In Schmerber v. California,229 the
Court applied fourth amendment limitations to a bodily inva-
sion to obtain evidence of crime. While the Court upheld the
governmental intrusion, it acknowledged that "the integrity of
an individual's person is a cherished value in our society..."
and that the human dignity and privacy at stake are a
"fundamental human interest. '230
m Comment, Constitutional Law-The Right to Privacy-New York Statute In-
terfering with Constitutionally Protected Doctor-Patient Relationship Invalida-
ted-Roe v. Ingraham, 50 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1149, 1156-57 (1975).
"I See Griswold, supra note 219 at 216-17.
225 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727-48 (1971) (White, Stewart,
and Marshall, J.J., concurring).
221 Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee,
60 CORNELL L. Rav. 231 (1975).
22 See generally Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Griswold, supra note 219
at 226; Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 34 (1967).
22 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). "The overriding function of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion
by the State." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
r' 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
21 Id. at 770, 772.
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In Griswold v. Connecticut23 ' the Supreme Court first rec-
ognized the right to privacy as a fundamental constitutional
guarantee. In that case, the Court invalidated a Connecticut
statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married cou-
ples and the distribution of birth control information and de-
vices to them as violating the fundamental right to privacy.
The Court presented a comprehensive treatment of the consti-
tutional right to privacy, with the majority rendering four sepa-
rate opinions, upholding that right under three distinct theo-
ries.
The opinion of the Court, by Mr. Justice Douglas, was
based on several amendments23 2 among the first ten:
"[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance. . . . Various guarantees create zones
of privacy."23 Justice Douglas reasoned that although the con-
stitution nowhere specifically mentions a right to privacy, the
guarantees that are expressly stated embody aspects of that
right .3 4
Justice Goldberg, concurring, concentrated on the ninth
amendment as an expression by the framers of the constitution
that certain personal rights should not be denied simply be-
cause they are not expressly stated in the first eight amend-
ments. He defined these personal rights as those so rooted in
the traditions and collective consciousness of our society as to
be considered fundamental. 235 Justice Goldberg classified the
right to privacy as one of those unenumerated rights, emanat-
ing "from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which
we live. ' 236 In determining which rights are fundamental, and
therefore to be afforded the Constitution's protected status,
Justice Goldberg set forth the following test:
[J]udges are not left at large to decide cases in light of their
personal and private notions. Rather, they must look to the
' 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
232 Id. at 484.
2 Id.
zu Id.
z Id. at 487.
2u Id. at 494 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (1961) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting)).
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"traditions and [collective] conscience of our people" to de-
termine whether a principal is "so rooted [there] .. .as to
be ranked as fundamental." The inquiry is whether a right
involved "is of such a character that it cannot be denied
without violating those 'fundamental principals of liberty
and justice which lie at the base of our civil and political
institutions.' "7
Justices Harlan and White, concurring in separate opin-
ions, upheld the challenge to the Connecticut statute on the
basis of due process under the fourteenth amendment. Mr.
Justice Harlan sought to reaffirm the principle that due process
can serve as a vehicle for protecting rights not specifically men-
tioned in the Constitution.23 Justice White found constitu-
tional protection for unenumerated rights under the concept of
"liberty. ' 239 Neither Justice Harlan nor Justice White specifi-
cally referred to a "right to privacy," but both offered a sub-
stantive due process approach for protecting rights not enumer-
ated in the Constitution.
The Supreme Court in Griswold did not define the scope
of the constitutional right to privacy but left its boundaries to
be determined on a case-by-case basis. In analyzing whether
this unenumerated right of privacy provides any constitutional
support for acts which terminate life, one must examine the
cases construing the right. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,240 a case
involving the regulation of contraceptive dissemination, four
Justices observed: "if the right to privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child. '24' The concept of personal privacy has not been
limited to matters of sexual privacy. In the context of chal-
lenges to abortion laws, this right has been extended to protect
27 381 U.S. at 493 (citations omitted).
23 Id. at 499. See also Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fun-
damental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235, 245-46
(1965).
2'1 381 U.S. at 502. Justice White pointed out that "there is a 'realm of family life
which the state cannot enter' without substantial justification." Id. (quoting Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
240 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
",' Id. at 453.
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the right of a pregnant woman to determine whether to con-
tinue or terminate her pregnancy before the embryo has quick-
ened.242 Stanley v. Georgia 2 also reinforces the notion that
personal privacy extends well beyond matters of procreation.
Acknowledging the "fundamental . . . right to be free, except
in very limited circumstances, from unwarranted governmen-
tal intrusions into one's privacy, 244 the Court held that a per-
son could not be punished for private possession of obscene
material.
Numerous state and federal opinions utilizing the right to
privacy indicate recognition of a right to control one's own
body. In Erickson v. Dilgard245 a New York court applied the
right of privacy principle to a situation in which refusal of a
blood transfusion placed a patient in danger of death. Uphold-
ing the right of the patient to refuse treatment, the court as-
serted that under our system of government, the individual
must be free to make medical decisions so long as he is compe-
tent to do so.245 A hospital's petition for a court order requiring
a 72-year-old woman to have a blood transfusion was refused
in Palm Springs General Hospital, Inc. v. Martinez.247 The
court stated that "a conscious patient, who is mentally compe-
tent has the right to refuse medical treatment, even when the
best medical opinion deems it essential to save her life."248
Likewise, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has upheld
the prerogative of a competent patient to refuse a blood trans-
fusion by rejecting the plea of a hospital official that a guardian
be appointed to authorize the treatment. 249 Although the ma-
242 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
243 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
21 Id. at 564.
215 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1962).
2I Id. at 706.
2W7 Case No. 71-1268 (Cir. Ct. of Dade County, Fla. July 2, 1971).
241 Id. Accord, In re Raesch, No. 455-996 (Milwaukee County Ct., filed January
27, 1972), discussed in Sullivan, The Dying Person-His Plight and His Right, 8 NEw
ENGLAND L. Rv. 197, 198, 205 (1973). In honoring Mrs. Martinez's decision, the court
may well have been conforming to the accepted medical practice. That is, valuable
hospital and medical resources are not usually expended upon a terminal patient who
no longer desires life-prolonging treatment which offers, at best, a brief reprieve from
death. See Bryn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44
FORDHAM L. Rav. 1, 14 (1975).
211 In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972).
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jority concentrated on the patient's right to reject the transfu-
sion based on his religious beliefs,25 a concurring judge felt that
the court's decision could be justified on "the broader based
freedom of choice whether founded on religious beliefs or other-
wise." 211 Even though these decisions do not specifically men-
tion the patient's right to privacy, they nevertheless express the
belief that a person may decide to reject treatment without
government interference.
In In re Yetter 52 a lower Pennsylvania court upheld a pa-
tient's rejection of treatment. Mrs. Yetter, a 60-year-old in-
mate of a state mental institution, was examined by her physi-
cian, who discovered a possible carcinoma of the breast. She
refused corrective surgery and her brother petitioned for ap-
pointment as her guardian so he could consent to the surgery.
The court, citing Roe v. Wade,5S held:
[T]he cotstitutional right of privacy includes the right of a
mature competent adult to refuse to accept medical recom-
mendations that may prolong one's life and which, to a third
person at least, appear to be in his best interests; in short,
that the right of privacy includes a right to die with which
the State should not interfere where there are no minor or
unborn children and no clear and present danger to public
health, welfare or morals. . . .The Court should not interfere
even though her decision might be considered unwise, foolish
or ridiculous.25
B. Quinlan and the Evolving Right to Die
The constitutional right of privacy has been said to sup-
port a right to choose to die.2 5 Because the right of privacy is
a fundamental right, the fact that a person's death might result
from his assertion of that right should not be a basis for objec-
tion. It is submitted that the right of privacy should be viewed
as a fundamental aspect of personal liberty and that therefore
2 Id. at 375.
2' Id. at 376.
212 62 Pa. D. & C. 2d 619 (C.P. North Hampton County Ct. 1973).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"1 62 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 623-24.
2-1 Comment, Constitutional Law-No Constitutional Basis Exists to Permit a
Parent to Assert for His Adult Child a Right to Die, 7 TEx. TECH. L. Rav. 716, 721
(1976).
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a strict scrutiny approach including a search for a compelling
state interest should be employed whenever governmental in-
vasions of bodily privacy occur. "6 In the absence of a compel-
ling state interest, the right of privacy should allow an individ-
ual the choice of action or inaction, even though that choice
may result in the individual's death.
According to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the right of
privacy was "broad enough to encompass a patient's decision
to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances, in
much the same way as it is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision to terminate pregnancy under certain cir-
cumstances. 2 57 Although the court stressed that such a right
is not absolute and must yield to a compelling state interest,
the court denied the existence of such a compelling interest in
the instant circumstances. In Karen's circumstances the degree
of bodily invasion was so great and her prognosis so dim that
her right to privacy clearly outweighed any arguable state in-
terest."8 The court also pointed but that the right to privacy
would be illusory in the case of an incompetent like Karen
unless it could be exercised by someone on her behalf. If
Karen's guardian and family, acting as they believed Karen
would have acted, chose to terminate treatment, the court felt
that such a decision should be uncontradicted by society.259
If one accepts the New Jersey Supreme Court's analysis,
then in order to justify an invasion of bodily integrity the state
would have to demonstrate that a compelling state interest
exists and that it outweighs the countervailing interest in indi-
vidual rights .2 The compelling state interest standard requires
careful assessment of the asserted state interest, and then a
balancing of the extent of possible harm to the state against the
need to uphold an individual's rights of privacy and self-
determination.
The question remains as to what state interests can be
21 But cf. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
7 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
153 (1973).
355 A.2d at 663-64.
211 Id. at 664.
2 See Stanley v. Ga., 394 U.S. 557, 568 n.11 (1969); Note, Legal Analysis and
Population Control: The Problem of Coercion, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1856, 1875-79 (1971).
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considered compelling. As with the right of free religious exer-
cise, the right to privacy is not absolute, but must yield to a
compelling state interest. However, at least one commentator
has said that "[a] person who refused medical treatment on
philosophical or moral grounds should have his right as vigor-
ously protected as a person who refuses on religious grounds. ' 26 '
In In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.,262
a United States Court of Appeals upheld an order requiring a
mother with minor children to submit to a blood transfusion,
despite her religious beliefs forbidding such medical treatment.
The court's reasons for sustaining the order were three-fold:
First, the patient was incompetent when she rejected the trans-
fusion; second, the state has an interest as parens patriae in
preventing minor children from becoming wards of the state;
and finally, the court purported to permit the transfusion to
protect the hospital and medical personnel from potential civil
and criminal liability. These interests were compelling enough
to overcome the individual's prerogative to refuse treatment. In
his dissent Chief Justice Burger, then a circuit judge, referred
to notions of privacy in his discussion of the allocation of
decision-making power. He noted that Justice Brandeis in
speaking of the "right to be let alone . . . intended to include
a great many foolish, unreasonable and even absurd ideas
which do not conform, such as refusing medical treatment,
even at a great risk. '263
In United States v. George,264 the United States District
Court of Connecticut suggested another state interest sufficient
to override the right to withhold consent for medical treatment.
In that case the father of four minor children refused to receive
a blood transfusion because it conflicted with his religious be-
liefs. The court held that the state has an interest in upholding
respect for the doctor's conscience and professional oath and
therefore must not require a physician to forego what his re-
2, Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment: The State's Interest Re-evaluated, 51
MINN. L. Rxv. 293, 296 (1967).
2,2 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). See also
discussion of this case in text accompanying note 88, supra.
20 Id. at 1015-18.
214 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965). See also discussion of this case in text
accompanying notes 89-92, supra.
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sponsibility requires.265
Because of an individual's interest in bodily integrity, the
states should not be allowed to justify invading the patient's
right of privacy to protect their interest in the sanctity of life.
In fact, human dignity has been said to be enhanced by permit-
ting the individual to determine for himself which beliefs are
worth dying for.26 Such cases as In re Estate of Brooks2 7 and
Palm Springs General Hospital, Inc. v. Martinez265 indicate
that the refusal of ordinary procedures by a dying patient pres-
ents no threat to the sanctity of life significant enough to war-
rant state intervention.
Where a patient has minor children, the interest of the
state as parens patriae may intervene. The state's concern in
this context is that the loss of a parent will cause emotional
harm to a child and burden the state with the task of support-
ing surviving children. 29 However, there are numerous situa-
tions where a child may be left alone by a parent with conse-
quent emotional upheaval in the child. Service in the armed
forces, divorce, or even extended travel all result in separation
of parent and child but have never been the source of state
intervention; in fact, to suggest intervention would undoubt-
edly provoke protests of interference with personal liberty.
Basing the question of judicial intervention on financial
circumstances of the patient is in effect telling the patient that
his convictions will not be respected because he does not have
enough money. It is arguable that such de facto wealth discrim-
ination violates the Equal Protection Clause. 70 In actuality a
26 Id. at 754. The New Jersey Supreme Court in John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp.
v. Heston, 279 A.2d 670, 673 (N.J. 1971), also expressed a concern for respecting
physicians' judgment as to their professional responsibility in rejecting a challenge to
a court order requiring a blood transfusion against a patient's will.
2I Cantor, supra note 14, at 244.
26 205 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 1965).
26 Case No. 71-12678 (Cir. Ct. of Dade County, Fla. (July 2, 1971)). Also, the
policy of the Roman Catholic Church demonstrates that refusing extraordinary treat-
ment presents no threat to preserving the sanctity of life. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 25,
1957, at 1, col. 3.
25See 64 MICH. L. REv. 554, 560 (1966).
21 See Cantor, supra note 14, at 254. See generally Klein v. Nassau County Medi-
cal Center, 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Cantor, The Law and Poor People's
Access to Health Care, 35 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB. 901, 903-07 (1970). It is also
arguable, of course, that the state's economic interest simply cannot outweigh the
patient's interest in bodily integrity.
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patient who is not allowed to refuse medical treatment may
well become more of an economic burden than an asset. 1 Al-
though the economic factors justifying the intervention of a
court are not present in every case of refusal of treatment, some
judicial concern with the financial plight of a patient's survi-
vors is both understandable and proper.
The state's interest in upholding the respect of a doctor's
conscience and medical oath rests on the premise that physi-
cians will uniformly regard honoring the refusal of treatment
by a dying patient as contrary to their professional principles.
Because the relationship between a doctor and a patient is
consensual in nature, the physician's judgment is subservient
to the patient's right to self-determination. Therefore, the as-
sertion of a constitutional interest and bodily integrity in the
context of refusal of treatment outweighs the interest of the
state in upholding respect for the conscience and oath of doc-
tors.
A majority of Americans want to be able to tell their doctor
to let them die if they suffer from an incurable condition.2 72
That this right of privacy is a valuable individual right can
hardly be questioned; it is a prerequisite for psychological
health,23 for experiences of love and friendship,2 74 and for lib-
erty itself.2 75 Although the United States Supreme Court has
not yet determined whether any aspect of the right to die is
included in the constitutionally protected right of privacy,
other courts have so held. If the medical society can be assured
that the choice is a rational decision made by a competent
individual, the right to a natural death with dignity and with-
out pain must be granted.
271 The courts cannot ignore the rising cost of medical treatment. Allowing a
terminally ill patient or a patient who must receive extensive treatment to die might
well be the least expensive route for a family to take. A balancing test should be
utilized to determine the validity of money-saving measures which incidentally in-
fringe upon personal liberties.
2 See, e.g., National Moves Toward Right to Death, 2 CuRRENT OPINION 39 (1975).
In a Gallop poll 52% responded "yes" to the question "when a person has a disease
that cannot be cured, do you think doctors should be allowed by law to end the
patient's life by some painless means, if the patient and family request it?"
m A. WESTIN, PRIVACY IN FREEDOM 32-39 (1967).
2 Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968).
"I Id. at 483-84.
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CONCLUSION
In summarizing the procedures available to one desiring to
exercise his right to die a natural death, it is apparent that
neither the courts nor the legislatures have taken the initiative
to resolve the vagueness and inconsistency which exist both
within and among jurisdictions. A survey of the present state
of the law relating to the right to die indicates three possible
theories which might be accepted as a basis for refusing ex-
traordinary life-sustaining measures. First, the right to free-
dom of religion protects the right to refuse medical treatment,
although this right may be curtailed by the state's interest in
preserving life. Second, the courts may be sympathetic to an
individual's refusal of medical treatment based upon the con-
stitutional right of privacy argument. Third, the right to die
could be resolved through statutes.
The statutory approach to resolving this issue seems to be
the preferable method since it provides certainty as to how one
can exercise his right to die a natural death. In addition, legis-
lation could avoid the necessity of obtaining judicial permis-
sion before exercising the right to die. While the California
legislature should be commended for its progressiveness in
being the first to pass such a statute, the statute falls far short
of what it should encompass. Although the California legisla-
tion may have been precipitated by the Quinlan case, by its
express terms it would not be effective in the Quinlan situation.
First of all, the directive that the Act authorizes can only be
executed after the individual has been diagnosed as having a
terminal condition.276 Since Karen Quinlan was never con-
scious after having been diagnosed, it would have been impos-
sible for her to sign a directive under the California Act. Sec-
ondly, the Quinlan decision allowed a guardian to authorize the
withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures,2 7 whereas nothing in
the California legislation supports that possibility. Although
nothing in the statute expressly prohibits guardian authoriza-
28 California Assembly Bill No. 3060, supra note 11, § 1 (7188, 7187(e)). The
authors are assuming that Karen was in a "terminal condition" as defined in § 1
(7187(f)).
2" For a discussion of the Quinlan court's decision to grant such extraordinary
powers see text accompanying notes 205-216 supra.
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tion, a reading of the Act as a whole indicates that a guardian
could not sign the directive for another party.
Often a patient is not diagnosed as terminally ill until after
entering an unconscious state, and a natural death act such as
California's should provide for this situation. The California
Act states that the state legislature found that "adult persons
have the fundamental right to control the decisions relating to
the rendering of their own medical care, including the decision
to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in
instances of a terminal condition." '78 The legislature also found
that "in the interest of protecting individual autonomy, such
prolongation of life for persons with a terminal condition may
cause loss of patient dignity and unnecessary pain and suffer-
ing, while providing nothing medically necessary or beneficial
to the patient." 279 This legislation, as enacted, does not give
relief to those people who are in an unconscious state when
diagnosed as terminally ill. Even though a person might not be
in such a conscious state as to be capable of signing a directive,
he may still be in great pain. As the California statute is now
written, such people are treated inequitably.
In light of the California statute, the criticism that it is
impossible to execute a legally operative living will is con-
founding. To alleviate the deficiencies of the California statute
and avoid litigation similar to the Quinlan case, the authors
have proposed a "Right to Natural Death Act." The proposed
act is modeled after the California Act with substantial
changes to remedy the deficiencies mentioned above. The most
significant change is addition of a procedure for execution of a
valid living will when not currently in a terminal medical state.
Right to Natural Death Act
§ 1. This act shall be known as the Right to Natural Death
Act.
§ 2. The Legislature finds that adult persons have the funda-
mental right to control decisions relating to their own medical
care, including the decision to have life-sustaining procedures
withheld or withdrawn in the event of a terminal condition.
"I' California Assembly Bill No. 3060, supra note 11, § 1 (7186).
273 Id.
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The Legislature further finds that modem medical tech-
nology has made possible the artificial prolongation of human
life beyond natural limits.
The Legislature further finds that, in the interest of pro-
tecting individual autonomy, such prolongation of life for per-
sons with a terminal condition may cause loss of patient dig-
nity and unnecessary pain and suffering, while providing noth-
ing medically necessary or beneficial to the patient.
The Legislature further finds that there exists considerable
uncertainty in the medical and legal professions as to the legal-
ity of terminating the use or application of life-sustaining pro-
cedures where the patient has voluntarily and in sound mind
evidenced a desire that such procedures be withheld or with-
drawn.
In recognition of the dignity and privacy which patients
have a right to expect, the Legislature hereby declares that the
laws of this state shall recognize the right of an adult person
to make a written directive instructing his physician to with-
hold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures in the event of a
terminal condition.
§ 3. The following definitions shall govern the construction of
this Act.
(a) "Attending physician" means the physician(s) se-
lected by, or assigned to, the patient, who has primary respon-
sibility for the treatment and care of the patient.
(b) "Declarant" means an individual who has executed
a directive pursuant to this Act.
(c) "Directive" means a written document voluntarily
executed by the declarant in accordance with the requirements
of Section 4.
(d) "Life-sustaining procedure" means any medical pro-
cedure or intervention which utilizes mechanical or other artifi-
cial means to sustain, restore, or supplant a vital function,
which, when applied to the declarant, would serve only to post-
pone artificially the moment of death and where, in the judg-
ment of the attending physician, death is imminent whether or
not such procedures are utilized. "Life-sustaining procedure"
shall not include the administration of medication or the per-
formance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to alle-
viate pain.
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(e) "Physician" means a physician or surgeon licensed
by the . (state medical board)
(f) "Terminal condition" means an incurable condition
caused by injury, disease, or illness, which regardless of the
application of life-sustaining procedures, would, within reason-
able medical judgment, produce death, and where the applica-
tion of life-sustaining procedures serves only to postpone the
moment of death of the declarant 80
§ 4. (a) Any mentally competent person eighteen years of age
or older may execute a directive. This Act establishes a rebutt-
able presumption that the declarant was mentally competent
to execute the directive on the date of execution.
(b) The directive shall be signed by the declarant in the
presence of two witnesses who:
1. Are not related to the declarant by blood or marriage;
2. Would not be entitled to any portion of the estate of the
declarant upon his decease under any will of the declarant or
codicil thereto then existing or, at the time of the directive,
by operation of laws then existing;
3. Do not have a claim against any portion of the estate of
the declarant upon his decease at the time of the execution
of the directive; and
4. Are not attending physicians at the time of the execution
of the directive.
It is not necessary that the witnesses know the content of the
directive, but they must witness the signing of the directive.
(c) The directive shall be in the following form:
Directive to Physicians
Directive made this day of
(month, year).
I, , being of sound mind, willfully,
and voluntarily make known my desire that my life shall not
be artificially prolonged under the circumstances set forth
below, and do hereby declare that:
1. If at any time I should have an incurable injury, dis-
ease, or illness certified to be a terminal condition by two phy-
Im The authors realize that this definition is broad. However, it is necessarily
broad to cover a wide variety of situations. The definition we use is identical to that
used in the California Natural Death Act.
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sicians, other than my attending physician(s), and where the
application of life-sustaining procedures would serve only to
postpone artificially the moment of my death and where my
physician determines that my death is imminent as a result of
aforesaid incurable injury, disease, or illness whether or not
life-sustaining procedures are utilized, I direct that such proce-
dures be withheld or withdrawn, and that I be permitted to die
naturally.
2. In the absence of my ability to give directions regard-
ing the use of such life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention
that this directive shall be honored by my family and physi-
cian(s) as the final expression of my legal right to refuse medi-
cal or surgical treatment and accept the consequences of such
refusal.
3. If I have been diagnosed as pregnant and that diagno-
sis is known to my physician, this directive shall have no force
or effect during the course of my pregnancy.
4. I understand the full import of this directive and I am
emotionally and mentally competent to make this directive.
Signed
City, County and State of Residence
I believe the declarant to be of sound mind.
Witness
Witness
§ 5. (a) A directive may be revoked at any time by the declar-
ant, without regard to his mental competency, by any of the
following methods:
1. By being canceled, defaced, obliterated, burnt, torn,
or otherwise destroyed by the declarant or by some person in
his presence and by his direction.28 '
2. By a written revocation of the declarant expressing
his intent to revoke, signed and dated by the declarant.
"' This subsection ties in with section 6. In effect, if the directive has been de-
stroyed it is revoked regardless of the intent of the declarant. The authors realize that
a situation might arise in which the directive was destroyed without the declarant's
intent to revoke it. On the other hand, a situation might also arise in which the intent
to revoke was present but all evidence indicates the intent was not present. Weighing
these two possibilities, the authors determined that for the protection of the physician
and the declarant, the directive must be in existence and in the possession of the
physician before it can be given effect.
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3. By a verbal expression by the declarant of his intent
to revoke the directive.
(b) Upon revocation of a directive a declarant cannot
revive the revoked directive by (1) re-executing the revoked
directive or (2) revoking the revoking instrument. The individ-
ual may, however, execute a new directive separate and apart
from the revoked instrument.
(c) There shall be no criminal or civil liability on the part
of any person for failure to act upon a revocation made pur-
suant to this section unless that person has actual knowledge
of the revocation.
§ 6. No physician or health facility which, acting in accord-
ance with the requirements of this chapter, causes the with-
holding or withdrawing of life-sustaining procedures from a
declarant, shall be subject to civil liability therefrom. No li-
censed health professional, acting under the direction of a phy-
sician who participates in the withholding or withdrawing of
life-sustaining procedures in accordance with the provisions of
this chapter shall be subject to any civil liability. No physician
or licensed health professional acting under the direction of a
physician who participates in the withholding or withdrawing
of life-sustaining procedures in accordance with the provisions
of this chapter shall be guilty of any criminal act or of unprofes-
sional conduct.
§ 7. (a) Prior to effectuating a withholding or withdrawing of
life-sustaining procedures from a declarant pursuant to a direc-
tive, the attending physician shall:
1. Have in his possession such directive, determine
that the directive complies with Section 4, and if possible,
determine that the directive is consistent with the present de-
sires of the individual, and;
2. Secure a notarized statement from two physicians
who are neither attending physicians nor witnesses to the direc-
tive, certifying that the declarant is in a terminal condition.
The physician shall make the directive, or a photostatic copy
thereof, and the notarized statements from the two physicians
a part of the patient's medical record.
(b) Any physician who certifies the terminal condition of
a patient pursuant to subsection (a) (2) may revoke such certifi-
cation by notifying the attending physician either verbally or
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in writing. In such instance, the attending physician shall cease
the withdrawal and withholding of life-sustaining procedures
until he has:
1. Secured from the certifying physician the reasons
for the revocation of the certification;
2. Determined that the reasons for revocation given by
the certifying physician have no basis; and
3. Procured a notarized statement from another physi-
cian in order to satisfy subsection (a)(2).
(c) No physician and no licensed health professional act-
ing under the direction of a physician shall be criminally or
civilly liable for failing to effectuate the directive of the declar-
ant pursuant to this section; however, a failure by a physician
to effectuate the directive of a declarant pursuant to this divi-
sion shall constitute unprofessional conduct if the physician
refuses to make the necessary arrangements or fails to take the
necessary steps to effect the transfer of the declarant to another
physician who will effectuate the directive of the declarant.
§ 8. (a) The withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining
procedures from a declarant in accordance with the provisions
of this Act shall not, for any purpose, constitute a suicide.
(b) The making of a directive pursuant to Section 4 shall
not restrict, inhibit, or impair in any manner the sale, procure-
ment, or issuance of any policy of life insurance, nor shall it be
deemed to modify the terms of an existing policy of life insur-
ance. No policy of life insurance shall be legally impaired or
invalidated in any manner by the withholding or withdrawing
of life-sustaining procedures from an insured declarant, not-
withstanding any term of the policy to the contrary.
(c) No physician, health facility, or other health provi-
der, and no health care service plan, insurer issuing disability
insurance, self-insured employee welfare benefit plan, or non-
profit hospital service plan shall require any person to execute
a directive as a condition for being insured for, or receiving,
health care services.
§ 9. Nothing in this Act shall impair or supersede any legal
right or legal responsibility which any person may have to ef-
fect the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining proce-
dures in any lawful manner. In such respect the provisions of
this chapter are cumulative.
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§ 10. Any person who willfully conceals, cancels, defaces, ob-
literates, or damages the directive of another without such de-
clarant's consent shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Any person
who, except where justified or excused by law, falsifies or forges
the directive of another, or willfully conceals or withholds per-
sonal knowledge of a revocation as provided in Section 5 with
the intent to cause a withholding or withdrawing of life-
sustaining procedures contrary to the wishes of the declarant,
and thereby, because of any such act, directly causes life-
sustaining procedures to be withheld or withdrawn and death
thereby to be hastened, shall be subject to prosecution for un-
lawful homicide as provided in _ . (state penal code).
§ 11. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to condone, au-
thorize, or permit any affirmative or deliberate act or omission
to end life other than to permit the natural process of dying as
provided in this Act.
§ 12. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to
any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity
shall not affect other provisions or applications of the Act
which can be given effect without the invalid provision or ap-
plication, and to this end the provisions of this Act are sever-
able.
Douglas Becker
Robert Fleming
Rebecca Overstreet
1977]
